Intervening Politics: NATO and Its Member States in Libya and Mali

As NATO member states prepared to convene at the September 2014 summit, the North Atlantic alliance’s ability to project the collective power of its member states was a central concern. The wake-up call provoked by Russia’s actions in Ukraine indicated that the 65-year-old alliance is far from retirement age. Founded in peacetime under the shadow of Cold War, the NATO alliance continues to have an important deterrent function. Also, on several occasions since the Cold War’s end, member states have called upon NATO to serve as an institution to make war in so-called “out-of-area” operations.

In collaboration with the RAND Corporation’s National Defense Research Institute division, the SIPA Capstone project considered the models of intervention used by NATO and its member states in the recent cases of Libya and Mali, with a view to defining the salient factors leading to the selection of each model and the consequences on the conduct of the intervention. France’s initial action in Libya in 2011 quickly became part of a tight coalition effort, and later progressed to a NATO-led operation. By contrast, France intervened in Mali in 2013 almost unilaterally, with limited support from allies. Both cases showcased the role of national-level political will on the decision to intervene, the form of the operations, and the contributions of partners, with important consequences for fighting effectiveness. The resulting report, Intervening Politics, recommends that future decision-makers take note of the enablers and constraints that working through NATO, and not, revealed in the Libya and Mali cases.