

A Risk Assessment Index for Security and Human Rights

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Abstract

This report was produced for the United States Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor as part of the Capstone program at the Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs in response to the question of how to assess risk of human rights violations by security forces. Diplomacy Lab enables the State Department to “course-source” research and innovation related to foreign policy by harnessing the efforts of students and faculty at universities across the country. Learn more at diplomacylab.org. The goal was to develop an analytical framework and a prototype tool to help predict the likelihood that a partner nation’s security forces will commit Gross Violations of Human Rights (GVHRs). Given there are no existing indices that focus on the risk of GVHRs, the analytical approach to predict GVHRs relied on an evaluation of existing indicators used in leading assessments of human rights, democracy, or conflict risk. The evaluation was conducted based on a comparative dataset that included countries that had and had not committed GVHRs. In order to create the prototype tool within the project’s three-month time frame, the team selected a representative subset of 30 countries. In the future, the predictive power of the tool can be refined by expanding the dataset of countries. The prototype consists of a user-interfaced questionnaire that evaluates both quantitative and qualitative data to assign a relative risk profile to partner nations’ security forces utilizing an indicator weighting system to assign countries to one of five risk ranges. Answers to the questionnaire and their respective weights within each risk area will identify where strengths and weaknesses exist that led to a country’s total risk score. Two case studies using the São Paulo Military Police and the Iraqi Armed Forces demonstrate the effectiveness of the prototype.

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Executive Summary

Background

Human rights are an essential element of global security. Human rights violations pose a serious challenge to governments in advancing foreign policy interests. As one of the world leaders in establishing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the government of the United States has taken measures to reduce security cooperation with foreign forces that commit gross violations of human rights (GVHRs), specifically extrajudicial killing, torture, rape and sexual assault, and enforced disappearance.

Objective

As of 2017, no diagnostic tool currently exists to assist security sector policy makers in assessing the risk that a foreign security force will commit a GVHR. The United States Department of State's Leahy vetting process (implemented per section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and 10 U.S. Code Section 362) currently investigates all foreign security forces nominated to receive U.S. Assistance to ensure that this assistance in the form of equipment and training does not go to individuals or units that have committed GVHRs. However, this vetting process has several limitations including its inability to prevent GVHRs or solve the human rights violations of foreign military and police units. Absent a more comprehensive risk assessment framework, the U.S. government must evaluate incidents and security force assistance on a fact-specific basis, only after a GVHR has occurred. The collective body of qualitative and quantitative evidence available suggests that certain factors or indicators may be predictive of GVHRs. The aim of this project is to promote the oversight of security forces, rule of law, and respect for human rights by introducing an assessment framework based on leading indicators that can assign relative risk profiles to national security forces.

Definitions

In this report, a GVHR is defined as a serious violation of international human rights law that involves any of the following forms of violence: extrajudicial killing, torture, rape and sexual assault, and enforced disappearance.

Methodological steps

- 1) The team collected and reviewed leading indicators of risk for human rights abuse, focusing on the GVHRs of extrajudicial killing, torture, rape and sexual assault, and enforced disappearance using existing indices for conflict risk and human development.
- 2) Using historical data and quantitative human rights indices and datasets, the team created an original dataset of 128 indicators and compiled the associated data for a 30-country sample which included both countries that committed GVHRs, and those that did not. Countries that did not commit GVHRs were labeled "clean" or "non-GVHR" countries.
- 3) The 128 indicators were then ranked and assigned relative weights based on their correlative strength determined by a scoring methodology that compared historical data in cases where GVHRs did and did not occur. Indicators that showed strongest correlative power were retained, resulting in a final list of 77 indicators.

- 4) The team used these indicators to design a questionnaire that evaluates both quantitative and qualitative data to assign a relative risk profile to partner nations' security forces: The Country Risk Score & Profile (CRSP).
- 5) The weighted scoring system was used to allocate a general risk score as well as a comprehensive assessment of specific areas of risk. Answers to the questionnaire and their respective weights within each risk area will identify the strengths and weakness that led to a country's total risk score. The result is the Risk Assessment Index for Security and Human Rights (RAISHR).
- 6) Two case studies using the Iraqi Federal Army and the São Paulo Military Police were developed to test the effectiveness of the tool.

Current State of the Field

In order to produce a global risk assessment framework for GVHRs, the team examined the comprehensive body of literature related to security sector reform in order to inventory the institutional, technical, and societal indicators of risk that have been assessed by credible experts and institutions as important for the prevention of and accountability for GVHRs.

The Nature and Use of Existing Indicators

Indicators are an important quantitative and qualitative tool for policy formation, evaluation, and enforcement in the human rights field, yet they remain underutilized, according to the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR). Indicators have historically been used in human rights monitoring systems of United Nations treaty bodies, special rapporteurs, and the universal periodic review of the Human Rights Council, for example. In recent years, policy makers and human rights activists have consistently called for the use of indicators in human rights assessments and policy implementations alongside other rights-based approaches such as United Nations human rights mechanisms, national human rights action plans, and regional and national human rights institutions.

The team's preliminary findings on leading indicators of GVHRs by security forces were based largely on information available from established quantitative human rights indices and datasets, the World Bank, the UN and related agencies, Special Rapporteurs for Torture and Combating Impunity, the Geneva Center for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, the Center for Civilians in Conflict, NGOs and other human rights documentation groups, the Security Force Monitor, and other credible research organizations that specialize in security sector issues.

In 2012, OHCHR published a comprehensive guide to "Human Rights Indicators" that served as a foundation for the team's investigation into indicators from a human rights perspective. This 174-page guide, produced at the request of the UN inter-committee meeting of treaty bodies, addresses concerns related to the monitoring, collection, and interpretation of human rights indicators, recognizing their practical use while also acknowledging their inherent limitations.

OHCHR broadly defines a human rights indicator as "specific information on the state or condition of an object, event, activity or outcome that can be related to human rights norms and standards; that addresses and reflects human rights principles and concerns; and that can be used to assess and monitor the promotion and implementation of human rights."¹ All indicators rely on benchmarks, which are predetermined values based on normative or empirical considerations. While benchmarks attempt to measure the unquantifiable in human rights compliance, the primary interest in using indicators for human rights is in "measuring a few relevant features that could be related to an improvement in the realization and the enjoyment of human rights, or in assessing the efforts being made by the duty bearer in meeting its human rights obligations."²

¹ "Human Rights Indicators: A Guide to Measurement and Implementation," United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 16.

² *Ibid.*, 21.

OHCHR divides data that is integrated into indicators into the following four categories: events-based data on human rights violations, socio-economic and administrative statistics, perception and opinion surveys, and data based on expert judgements. Furthermore, human rights indicators can be broken down into several categories, but they are limited to the human rights context due to the fact that they are based on specific human rights standards and norms. OHCHR categorizes indicators in the following ways:

- 1) *Quantitative and Qualitative Indicators*: Quantitative indicators are closely linked to statistics and are expressed in numbers, percentages, or indices.³ On the other hand, qualitative indicators imply a narrative or categorical form.⁴
- 2) *Fact-based and Judgement-based Indicators*: Fact-based indicators are based on information content that is objective, while judgment-based indicators rely on content that is subjective.⁵
- 3) *Performance and Compliance Indicators*: Performance indicators allow the verification of changes produced by development intervention relative to what was planned based on programming principles and terminologies. Meanwhile, compliance indicators capture the extent to which human rights obligations are being met.

The Strengths and Weaknesses of Indicators

The comprehensive review of published literature on indicators and risk assessment frameworks reveals that the indicator is a deeply flawed but useful human rights tool that can be applied to assist policy makers and other human rights stakeholders. As Navi Pillay, the former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, said, “We should never forget that behind every piece of statistical data are human beings who were born free and equal in dignity and rights. We must strive to make their human rights stories, especially those of the powerless, visible through robust indicators and to use them in constantly improving our human rights policies and implementation systems to bring positive change to people’s lives.”

Unlike general statistics, indicators can be more readily applied and interpreted, making them useful to relevant stakeholders. OHCHR concludes that while a more in-depth, qualitative assessment remains the cornerstone of all human rights monitoring, indicators can serve as an important piece of the human rights journey from standard-setting to policy formation.

One key challenge, that the team encountered when attempting to select and test human rights indicators, was the lack of available information regarding the indicators. OHCHR defines access to information as a human right, underlining the absence of data as a major impediment to indicators. As of 2010, the right to information was enshrined in international human rights treaties (specifically, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) and approximately 90 countries had adopted right-to-information legislation,⁶ yet accessing data remains a challenge to human rights framework. The lack of information was a hurdle on two fronts. First, it was difficult to know with certainty where, when, or how GHVRs are occurring. Second, the data

³ Ibid., 16-17.

⁴ Ibid., 16-17.

⁵ Ibid., 17.

⁶ Ibid., 47.

behind human rights indicators, more so than economic indicators, are often hidden, protected, or falsified by countries that commit GVHRs.

Recognizing common misconceptions and concerns about the use of indicators, it is important to note that indicators are not intended to rank countries according to human rights performance due to the multifaceted, interrelated and interdependent nature of human rights standards.⁷ In approaching the selection of potential indicators and the number required to accurately assess risk, OHCHR found that “it is important to have a comprehensive set of indicators on human rights standards, with the actual choice of indicators made by users in the light of their objective and national context.”⁸

In order for indicators to be of use to policy makers, they must be precisely defined based on acceptable methodology of data collection that takes into account ethical, statistical and human rights considerations.⁹ OHCHR offers a basic “RIGHTS” criteria by which to judge indicator selection, which ranks indicator selection based on the following factors: relevant and reliable; independent in its data-collection methods; global and universally meaningful but also amenable to contextualization and disaggregation by prohibited grounds of discrimination; human rights standards-centric, transparent in its methods, timely and time-bound; simple and specific.¹⁰

The Process of Developing Risk Assessment Tools

In developing a framework for identifying and categorizing indicators, “the use of a standardized template is inevitable and also desirable.”¹¹ In order to conceptualize such a risk assessment tool, the team analyzed existing indicator and assessment tools as part of the preliminary research.

The following are major indexes and indicator sets that the team referenced in the preliminary examination of risk assessment tools: Bertelsmann Transformation Index, CIDCM International Crisis Behavior, Civil Society Index CIVICUS, Economist Democracy Index, Failed States Index, Freedom House “Freedom in the World” Report, Global Integrity Report, Global Peace Index, HIIK Conflict Barometer, IISS Military Balance, International Crime Victims Survey, Open Budget Index, Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger, Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide, Political Terror Scale, Polity IV Project, SIPRI Data on Military Expenditure, Small Arms Survey, Survey on Crime Trends, Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset and Battle Death Data, US Annual Trafficking in Persons Report, Worldwide Governance Indicators, and World Prison Brief.

One example the team looked at closely was The Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index, in publication since 2005, which utilizes 12 conflict risk indicators and additional sub-indicators to

⁷ Ibid., 30.

⁸ Ibid., 29.

⁹ Ibid., 45.

¹⁰ Ibid., 50.

¹¹ Ibid., 72.

measure the condition of a state at any given moment. The Fund for Peace, a leader in the conflict assessment and early warning field, collects thousands of reports and pieces of data yearly to assess the social, economic, and political pressures faced by 177 countries. The objective of the index is to promote sustainable security and the ability of a country to maintain peace without outside military intervention or presence. Part of the content analysis process of the Failed States Index involves software to produce an algorithm that provides a score representing the significance of each of the various pressures for a given country. These indicators are divided into three categories: social, economic, and political/military.¹² The index emphasizes that differences in scoring is not the ultimate goal; rather, it is more important to find larger trends from the extensive data used.

Another example that the team analyzed closely was the Governance and Conflicts Indicator Report of DFID, which reported on DFID's methodology to test a list of 165 indicators using a set of normative criteria. Like the team's own work, this study was constrained by time and available information. Nonetheless, this example offered several recommendations for developing a good results framework in the face of constraints. The primary takeaway from the research done by DFID recognized that indicators "do not exist in isolation but form part of a causal relationship with a subordinate or higher level result."¹³ It also recognized the need for "data robustness," which is the idea that relevant indicators are statistically credible and can stand-up to a range of data quality assurance tests.¹⁴ In order to assess the indicators, DFID utilized three tests: the first for Relevance, second for Utility, and third for Robustness. The findings were then subjected to a country-specific relevance test that assessed for utility against six countries: Afghanistan, Burundi, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda and Tanzania. The research also revealed the dangers of embarking on an indicator list in that the result could "simply be a huge, long list of indicators."¹⁵ By analyzing the methodological frameworks of other risk assessment tools, both positive aspects and limitations of such risk assessment frameworks were identified.

¹² "Conflict Assessment Indicators: The Fund for Peace Country Analysis Indicators and their Measures," Fund for Peace, 5.

¹³ Ursula C. Schroeder, "Measuring Security Sector Governance: A Guide to Relevant Indicators," 9.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 11.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 70.

Methodology

The methodology used for this project was based on the premise that the new risk assessment tool should be applicable to military and police units worldwide. In this regard, the project faced unique challenges given the three-month time constraint; lack of streamlined, unit level data available for the international sector; and the untrodden task, in and of itself, to test for a new classification of GVHR indicators. Given these challenges, the team adopted the following methodology:

- 1) The team collected and reviewed leading indicators of risk for human rights abuse, focusing on the GVHRs of extrajudicial killing, torture, rape and sexual assault, and enforced disappearance.

- a) **Literature Review**

- The first phase of the project consisted of a literature review focused on the nature and use of existing indicators, the strengths and weaknesses of indicators, and the process by which other indices have been developed.

- b) **Universe of Indicators**

- The team compiled a “universe” of indicators from existing indices related to conflict risk, democracy, and freedom into an Excel sheet. Indicators that, in essence, measured the same risk factor were eliminated.

- 2) Using historical data and quantitative human rights indices and datasets, the team created an original dataset of 128 indicators with associated information for a 30-country sample that included both countries that had committed GVHRs and those that had not. Countries that did not commit GVHRs were labeled as “clean” or “non-GVHR” countries.

- a) **Matching of Datasets**

- For each indicator, a specific dataset was selected. The team prioritized datasets from established organizations and institutions, such as the UN and related agencies, the CIA, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the U.S. State Department, the OECD, and various NGOs. Once selected, each dataset was used consistently for all countries where possible.

- b) **Choice of GVHR Countries**

- An initial list of countries was selected using the U.S. government-sponsored Political Instability Task Force (PITF) Worldwide Dataset on atrocities.¹⁶ In the dataset, atrocities are broadly defined as the deliberate killing of non-combatant civilians in the context of wider conflict. This is consistent with the definition of GVHR adopted in this report.

¹⁶ “Political Instability Task Force Worldwide Atrocities Dataset,” Parus Analytics, accessed September 20, 2017, <http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/data.dir/atrocities.html>.

- i) The PITF dataset is updated on a monthly basis since January 1995 and built on open-source news reports. Data were filtered from the dataset by the following criteria:
 - (1) Included Atrocities
 - (a) Events that occurred between 2002 and 2017
 - (b) Events classified as committed by a “State Perpetrator”
 - (2) Excluded Atrocities
 - (a) Events labeled “Collateral Damage”
 - (b) Events defined as individual-committed murders, but not described as “Assassinations”
 - (c) Transnational events (the scope of the project does not cover violations committed by other government forces)
 - ii) This process of elimination enabled the team to narrow the list of countries to 72 that appeared at least once in the fifteen-year time period. To further narrow the list, an additional selection criteria was introduced: the selection of countries for which “Other Tactics” were labeled in the source article. This yielded a list of 32 countries. “Other Tactics,” aligned with the team’s definition of GVHRs, were as follows:
 - (1) Rape
 - (2) Assassination
 - (3) Kidnapping
 - (4) Disappearances
 - (5) Extrajudicial killing
 - (6) Torture
 - iii) Among the 32 countries that fell into the more stringent selection criteria, the four worst performing countries in terms of GVHRs for each of the five Department of State regions represented on the list were chosen. These were selected by looking at the number of years out of the fifteen that the country showed up on the list for use of “Other Tactics.” A map of these countries can be found in Appendix V.
 - iv) Using this process of elimination, the team was able to identify a consistent and inclusive list of 20 GHVR countries representative of the global security sector. Four more countries were later added to the GVHR country list. Having first been identified as “clean,” country research revealed this qualification to be false. These additional four countries spanned three Department of State regions, maintaining the representative nature of the selected countries.
- c) **Choice of Non-GVHR Countries**
- It was also necessary, for comparative purposes, to develop a list of “clean” countries without documentation of GVHRs. In order to compile a list of clean countries, the team utilized the annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices published by the U.S. Department of State. These reports detail country-specific human rights records and document yearly human rights violations. The Department of State prepares reports for all countries receiving assistance and all United Nations member states to

the U.S. Congress in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Trade Act of 1974.¹⁷ The team found the reports to be much more exhaustive and inclusive than those from other organizations the team considered, which led them to be vital to the task of correctly identifying non-GVHR countries. The team selected the year 2013 to begin to look at each country covered by these reports. The team compiled a list of countries that were not reported to have experienced any of the four GVHRs of interest for that year. The team then expanded the range to three years between 2013-2015. A country must not have had reports of any of the four GVHRs during this time period to be designated a “clean” country. This increased the assurance that the countries used were truly “clean.” Ultimately, the list of non-GVHR countries was supported by Department of State human rights reports published from 2013-2015 and consisted of six entries, covering nearly all geographic regions of interest. A map of all countries selected, both GVHR and clean, can be found in Appendix VI.

d) Choice of Year

The year *prior* to a GVHR atrocity from the PITF dataset was selected for GVHR countries to determine the year for which data should be collected. Non-GVHR countries were selected by looking at the year 2013 as a starting point. Recognizing the difficulty of predicting a country’s decline into GVHRs and understanding that human rights abuses can occur rapidly and without warning, the team selected the year before a reported GVHR atrocity to mimic the decision-making scenario that might be faced by the U.S. Department of State. By looking at the years prior to the committal of GVHRs, the tool can be predictive of factors that can lead to GVHRs.

e) Input Value for Each Country and Indicator

Looking at the datasets and selected human rights indexes, or through external research from open sources on historical data, information was logged for each indicator and country. While some indicators had a Boolean answer, others were numeric, either open or scaled. In cases where information was not available for the chosen year, data was used from the closest prior year in a five-year range. These exceptions are marked with notes on the Master List. If no data were available within a five-years-prior period, the indicator was denoted with a hyphen as a missing value.

3) The 128 indicators were then ranked and assigned a relative weight based on their correlative strength, using a scoring methodology that compared historical data in cases where GVHRs did and did not occur. Indicators that showed correlative power were retained, which resulted in a list of 77 final predictive indicators.

a) Ranking the Indicators

Analysis of the indicators involved understanding the impact of the particular indicator for the countries in the dataset. To do so, indicators were examined based on their applicability at various levels across both GVHR and non-GVHR countries. This was done by measuring the number of countries for which the chosen level of the indicator applied. To choose the threshold value, the non-GVHR countries were

¹⁷ "Human Rights Reports," U.S. Department of State, <https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/>.

analyzed to find the level at which one-third or fewer of the non-GVHR countries were captured. The logic of the Relative Indicator Strength Score (RISS) is explained below:

- i) One challenge that arose in ranking the indicators was how to score an indicator capturing only (although fewer) GVHR countries versus one capturing more GVHR countries, but also being applicable to one, or several, non-GVHR countries. To create a unit-free scoring system to neutralize this issue, a simple weighted average was used to develop the Relative Indicator Strength Score (RISS). It is computed as follows:

$$\frac{\text{\# of GVHR countries to which level is applicable}}{\text{total \# of GVHR countries}} - \frac{\text{\# of non-GVHR countries to which level is applicable}}{\text{total \# of non-GVHR countries}} = \text{RISS}$$

- ii) The denominators add to the total set of countries in the data set; were data on the entire world to be used, the *total # of GVHR countries+total # of non-GVHR countries* would equal the set of World countries. Based loosely on Burnley, Buda, and Kayitakire’s conflict assessment model, *total # of GVHR countries+total # of non-GVHR countries* equals Ω , a known element comprised of two elements C (total # of GVHR countries) and C’ (total # of non-GVHR countries) where C is a semi-open set between 0 and Ω . A country can enter the set C but cannot leave the set once it becomes a GVHR violator.¹⁸
- iii) The RISS penalizes an indicator’s strength for capturing a non-GVHR country within the specified threshold by subtracting a relatively larger portion out of the total possible score of 1. This is due to having a smaller number of non-GVHR countries than GVHR countries. As a result, a clean country included in the indicator subtracts 0.1667 from the RISS, while a GVHR country only adds 0.0417 to the RISS when there are no missing values for a given indicator.
- iv) The RISS falls between -1 and 1, with a score of -1 corresponding to an indicator level that applies to 0 GVHR countries and all non-GVHR countries. Given this and starting with the list of 128 indicators, the lower bound of the RISS was set at 0.25 to capture those indicators with a 0.25 or higher score. This left a total of 77 indicators with a RISS of 0.25 or higher. For those countries for which different threshold values, as described above, captured different numbers of countries from each category, the threshold value that produced the highest RISS value was chosen. For example, for the indicator “Maternal Mortality”, the threshold value >139 captures 13 out of 24 GVHR countries and 0 out of 5 non-GVHR countries, yielding a RISS of 0.5416. The threshold value >113 captures 16 out of 24 GVHR countries and 1 out of 5 non-GVHR countries, yielding a RISS of 0.466. So, the threshold >139 was chosen.

b) Weighting the Indicators

¹⁸ Clementine Burnley, Dirk Buda and Francois Kayitakire, “Quantitative Global Model for Armed Conflict Risk Assessment,” 40.

The RISS score was used to rank the 77 final indicators and assign their respective weights. The weighting was assigned in a manner that gives higher point values to higher risk countries. Logically, the weighting is meant to attribute higher point values to stronger indicators that will not capture non-GVHR countries. For the indicators that are still applicable to non-GVHR countries, those countries receive a relatively lower score for that indicator. Indicators were divided into 11 categories depending upon their RISS: those indicators with a RISS of 1 apply to all GVHR countries and no non-GVHR countries. They are the strongest indicators and therefore receive the highest weight. The remaining indicators were divided in increments of 0.075 based on their RISS, leaving a total of 11 categories, with the weakest indicators receiving 1 point and the strongest receiving 11 points. The total possible points therefore depend on the number of countries in the semi-open sets of GVHR and non-GVHR countries. However, given this sample size, the total possible point value is 456. The weighting system is setup as follows:

| Relative Indicator Strength Score (RISS) | Indicator Weight (points) |
|--|---------------------------|
| 1 | 11 |
| 0.925-0.999 | 10 |
| 0.85-0.924 | 9 |
| 0.775-0.849 | 8 |
| 0.7-0.774 | 7 |
| 0.625-0.699 | 6 |
| 0.55-0.624 | 5 |
| 0.475-0.549 | 4 |
| 0.4-0.474 | 3 |
| 0.325-0.399 | 2 |
| 0.25-0.324 | 1 |

This system of unequal weights depending on RISS follows the intuition of Chowdhury and Squire’s critiques of UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI) to give higher weights to more important categories. This system, which the authors propose as a modification of the HDI, will not penalize a non-GVHR country as harshly for falling inside the threshold of an unimportant category as it will for falling inside the threshold of a more highly correlated category, thereby exposing higher risk.¹⁹

c) Categorizing the Indicators

Given the final 77 indicators with a RISS at or above 0.25, the indicators were categorized into five categorical areas of risk. These are meant to provide greater insight not just into the country’s relative risk of GVHR violations, but also into the areas of risk, based on patterns identified in earlier phases of data collection and analysis. Using the legal framework of “means, motive, and opportunity,” the five risk areas were identified as:

¹⁹ Shyamal Chowdhury and Lyn Squire, “Setting Weights for Aggregate Indices,” 3-4.

- (1) Capacity
- (2) Structural Factors
- (3) Triggering Factors
- (4) History of GVHRs
- (5) Weakness of State Institutions

Sub-categories give further insight into specific areas of risk that may be useful for programming or resilience-building activities to reduce the relative risk in these areas.

- 4) The team used these indicators to design a user-interfaced questionnaire, evaluating both quantitative and qualitative data to assign a relative risk profile to partner nations’ security forces: The Country Risk Score & Profile (CRSP).

a) **Creating a Questionnaire**

Finally, a questionnaire was developed based on the threshold values identified in the RISS ranking process. The questionnaire, to be explained in the following pages, produces the final Country Risk Score (CRS) that falls in the following ranges:

| Country Risk Score (CRS) | GVHR Risk Level |
|--------------------------|-----------------|
| 0-90 | Very Low |
| 91-180 | Low |
| 181-270 | Moderate |
| 271-360 | High |
| 361-456 | Very High |

The resulting Country Risk Score Profile (CRSP) reveals the total relative risk range for a given country. In this way, the Index can be used to better understand risk overall, as well as breaking that score down by risk area to better inform U.S. Department of State policies related to security sector assistance, reform, and professionalization.

- 5) The weighted scoring system was used to allocate a general risk score as well as a comprehensive assessment of specific areas of risk. Answers to the questionnaire and their respective weights within each risk area will identify where strengths and weaknesses exist that led to a country’s total risk score. The result is a prototype Risk Assessment Index for Security and Human Rights (RAISHR). To see a map displaying the risk levels of all countries investigate, see Appendix VII.
- 6) Two case studies using the Iraqi Federal Army and the São Paulo Military Police were developed to test the effectiveness of the tool.

Methodological Challenges

1) Timeframe When Choosing Countries

When determining how to choose GVHR and non-GVHR countries, one of the challenges the team faced was deciding what time frame to select. For example, a country may have multiple years of transgressions on record, or it might have had one specific incident in one year while being clean in all other areas for the remainder of time. This challenge was not always easy to resolve. Given time constraints, the team decided to select the closest year to 2014, the year used for the two case studies.

2) Lack of Access to Data Regarding Unit-Level

It was a challenge to analyze and/or compare unit-level forces due to an overall lack of reliable data. Data is available on a country-by-country basis, not always easily accessible, and not collected comprehensively by a reliable third-party source.

3) Lack of Data on Specific GVHRs, Such as Rape.

The fact that a GVHR is not reported does not mean it did not occur - measuring and data on rape and sexual assault were particularly difficult to estimate, for example.

4) Selection of Non-GVHR Countries

- a) The majority of non-GVHR countries are located in Western Europe or North America. To guarantee the relevance of a comparison with GVHR countries, it was necessary to find features similar to those of countries where violations occurred. This posed a significant challenge.
- b) Lack of data on GVHR may sometimes falsely indicate that a country's security forces did not commit violations. This may be misleading and generate mistakes when choosing non-GVHR countries for a comparative study. However, in absence of formal information regarding GVHRs, this risk needs to be taken into account.

5) Integrating Qualitative Indicators

A challenge that was not overcome in this iteration of the tool is integrating qualitative indicators. Attempts were made to turn as many indicators as possible into "yes/no" questions. However, many indicators dealt with complicated and nuanced issues, making them impossible to answer with a concrete yes or no response. Under the current methodology of determining the RISS for each indicator, indicators had to be "answered" by way of a yes, no, or a number for a majority of the 30 countries examined to receive a RISS. The current system does not allow for incorporation of qualitative answers to indicators.

6) Different Types of Indicators Among Indexes (Qualitative vs. Quantitative)

See point 5.

7) Lack of Data for Specific Indicators, Such as IDPs

For some indicators which were deemed relevant, data was particularly hard to find. For example, obtaining the magnitude of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in

some countries was especially challenging, because in the majority of countries there is no national or international organization to comprehensively monitor and report figures on displacement. Moreover, in many cases, significant numbers of IDPs live outside of camps, including in host communities or urban areas, and are therefore not reflected in the official data.

8) Small Sample Size of Countries (Both GVHR and “Clean”)

The relatively low number of countries examined presented challenges for two reasons. First, the relative strength of the indicators relies on the correlation between countries. A low number of countries increases the chances of outliers, interfering with the ability to properly rank the strength of each indicator. Second, using a low number of clean countries, instead of a majority of GVHR countries, in the weighting methodology skews the rating in favor of having fewer clean countries fall within the threshold. This has the unintended effect of potentially applying less risk to the clean countries in certain situations and greatly increases the power that one outlier within the clean countries has to lower the strength score of an indicator.

Risk Areas

To assist policymakers in understanding what areas add to a country's risk profile, the team identified five risk areas under which to categorize the 77 indicators. The five risk areas for indicators are: capacity, structural factors, triggering factors, history of GVHRs, and weakness of state institutions. The five categories and their subcategories, each assigned a certain value of points, can help policymakers target specific areas in which nations lack thorough programming and support in order to build resilience and lessen the CRS of a given nation.

The first category, capacity, identifies the means or lack of means through which a security force would be capable of committing GVHRs. Their "ability" to commit the crime is the first step in its commission. The second two categories, structural factors and triggering factors, respectively identify long-term and short-term conditions that may act as a motive to incite security forces with the capacity for violence to commit GVHRs. The fourth category, history of past GVHRs, identifies additional motives for security forces to commit GVHRs, while also identifying the level of impunity with which past violations have been treated. The final category, weakness of state institutions, identifies the gaps in governance and law that act as an opportunity for GVHRs to occur. The combinations of factors in each of the five risk areas act as a nation's means, motive, and opportunity to commit GVHRs.

The categorization of indicators listed below uses each indicator only once and includes its indicator weight on a 1 to 11-point scale, with 11 points corresponding to the strongest indicators and 1 point corresponding to the weakest indicators. The points were assigned based on an indicator's RISS. For a complete description of each indicator, including its positive or negative correlation to GVHRs, see Appendix I.

I. **Risk Area 1: Capacity (32 points)**

Capacity identifies the means that security forces possess that allow them to commit GVHRs. This risk area includes driving factors that might explain the means behind the perpetration of GVHRs by security forces, or in some cases, the lack of means to meet international standards in the human rights arena that could act as a buffer for GVHRs.

Assumption: GVHRs are unlikely to be committed by security forces unless the security apparatus has the means and reach to perpetrate these violations. Capacity, or the means to commit a GVHR, is also considered as a lack of means for the security apparatus to operate within international standards. Some indicators indicate a positive correlation to violence. In this case, it could be assumed that unless the amount of resources is paired with positive factors, a greater capacity of security forces can result in a higher risk of perpetration of violations. Other indicators show a negative correlation, revealing that in certain cases, a lack of means correlates with higher risk. Here, a lack of resources is indicative of a security apparatus that does not have the means to conduct its objectives in compliance with international standards. This risk area leaves room for improvement with unit-specific subcategories.

Indicators:

1. Availability of resources (personnel, arms, ammunition, or other financial resources) for enforcement and repression (32 points)

- *Military Expenditure per soldier (9 points)*
- *Military expenditure per capita (8 points)*
- *U.S. humanitarian aid to country (6 points)*
- *Amount of military U.S. foreign aid given to country (6 points)*
- *Military expenditure in terms of GDP (3 points)*

II. Risk Area 2: Structural Factors (303 points)

This risk area includes any characteristic or circumstance within a country whose presence or absence is correlated with future GVHRs.

Assumption: GVHRs are correlated with existing conditions within societies. A risk assessment should predict the relative risk profile of the presence or absence of certain factors.

Indicators:

1. Level of Violence (34 points)

- *Score on Political Terror Scale (11 points)*
- *Political Stability and Absence of Violence and Terrorism (10 points)*
- *Peace years (10 points)*
- *Existing conflict? (3 points)*

2. Personal and Political Freedoms (24 points)

- *Right to life and security of person effectively guaranteed (7 points)*
- *Civil liberties (5 points)*
- *Press freedom (5 points)*
- *Reports of Political Prisoners? (3 Points)*
- *Political rights (2 points)*
- *Level of competition for political office (2 points)*

3. Economic Factors (105 points)

- *Foreign aid (dependency) (10 points)*
- *Government regulation of business (10 points)*
- *Income bracket (8 points)*
- *Remittances (8 points)*
- *Infrastructure (8 points)*
- *U.S. non-military aid (8 points)*
- *Resource rents (primary commodities) (3 points)*

a. Macroeconomic indicators (24 points)

- *GDP per capita (10 points)*
- *Poverty rate (7 points)*
- *Inflation rate (6 points)*
- *Unemployment (1 point)*

b. International trade (26 points)

- *Openness to trade (9 points)*

- *Export of goods and services (4 points)*
 - *Trade diversity (3 points)*
 - *Trade with neighboring countries (3 points)*
 - *Current account balance (3 points)*
 - *Oil exporter (2 points)*
 - *Manufacturing exports (2 points)*
4. **Environmental Factors (16 points)**
- *Energy consumption per capita (8 points)*
 - *Agricultural land (4 points)*
 - *Rate of deforestation (4 points)*
5. **Societal Make-up and Population Statistics (42 points)**
- *Youth bulge (8 points)*
 - *Population in agriculture (8 points)*
 - *Urban Population (8 points)*
 - *Urbanization growth rate (6 points)*
 - *Persecution of indigenous peoples (5 points)*
 - *Population density (3 points)*
 - *Ethnic diversity (2 points)*
 - *Is there a religious majority? (1 point)*
 - *Population growth rate (1 point)*
6. **Health Factors (58 points)**
- *Health expenditure per capita (9 points)*
 - *Food security (9 points)*
 - *Access to water (9 points)*
 - *Access to sanitation (8 points)*
 - *Life expectancy (8 points)*
 - *Infant/child mortality (7 points)*
 - *Maternal mortality (4 points)*
 - *Caloric intake/undernourishment (4 points)*
7. **Respect for Rights and Freedoms of Women and Children (24 points)**
- *Literacy rates (11 points)*
 - *Abortion to Save the Woman's Life or Prohibited altogether (7 points)*
 - *Gender Parity Index in primary level enrollment (6 points)*

III. **Risk Area 3: Triggering Factors (19 points)**

This risk area includes any circumstance or event that could amplify existing conditions to bring about the perpetration of GVHRs.

Assumption: A risk assessment should identify triggers in the form of policy changes or events that act as a spark to increase the probability that states will imminently commit GVHRs under these short-term circumstances.

Indicators:

1. **Declaration of state of emergency or special security measures that restrict the citizens' rights and pushback by citizens against government policy (6 points)**
 - *Is there a declared state of emergency? (3 points)*
 - *Reports of current Anti-government demonstrations? (3 points)*
2. **Spillover effects of instability, tensions from conflicts in neighboring countries (13 points)**
 - *Refugees Produced as % of Pop (8 points)*
 - *Refugees Hosted as % of Pop (5 points)*

IV. **Risk Area 4: History of GVHRs (42 points)**

This risk area includes past history of GVHRs and therefore represents a risk of future violations.

Assumption: A country that has a history of GVHRs or where GVHRs are presently occurring is more likely to commit GVHRs, especially where past GVHRs have not been fairly addressed through accountability, transitional justice, or other mechanisms.

Indicators:

1. **Past or present commission of GVHRs, which include extrajudicial killings, torture, enforced disappearances, and rape (25 points)**
 - *Reports of extrajudicial killings? (9 points)*
 - *Reports of torture? (7 points)*
 - *Reports of enforced disappearances? (6 points)*
 - *Reports of rape? (3 points)*
2. **Lack of mass pushback in the face of ongoing or predicted GVHRs. Absence of transitional justice or lack of initiatives for inclusivity and reconciliation following a conflict (6 points)**
 - *People do not resort to violence to redress personal grievances (6 points)*
3. **Impunity for evident GVHRs (11 points)**
 - *Rule of Law (11 points)*

V. **Risk Area 5: Weakness of State Institutions (60 points)**

This risk area includes common institutional factors that could affect the capacity of a country to prevent GVHRs by security forces, in addition to factors that identify the characteristics of governments that create environments conducive to GVHRs.

Assumption: When a country lacks appropriate institutions that are governed by the rule of law and good governance practices, its capacity to prevent the occurrence of GVHRs significantly decreases. Consequently, security forces could take advantage of this weakness to commit abuses on vulnerable populations.

Indicators:

1. **Absence of legal framework that prevents GVHRs through the ratification of international human rights treaties (5 points)**
 - *Combination: Did country sign AND NOT ratify ICPPED (4 points)*
 - *Combination: Did country sign AND NOT ratify Convention against Torture? (1 point)*
2. **Corruption and governance (55 points)**
 - *Regulatory Quality (11 points)*
 - *Control of Corruption (11 points)*
 - *Government Effectiveness (10 points)*
 - *Voice and Accountability (6 points)*
 - *Regime Durability (6 points)*
 - *Ungoverned spaces (5 points)*
 - *Level of Democracy (3 points)*
 - *Government share of GDP (2 points)*
 - *Prior democracy (1 point)*

TOTAL POINTS: 456

Questionnaire Prototype

The questionnaire prototype is organized by risk area as described previously and assigns points based on indicator strength and the specified threshold of the indicator. For complete instructions for each indicator's computation, see Appendix II: Questionnaire Indicator Instructions.

Risk Assessment Index

Input information for each indicator in the data column. CRS column shows indicator risk.

COUNTRY:

| | Data | CRS |
|---|---|----------|
| Risk Area 1: Capacity | | |
| Availability of resources (personnel, arms, ammunition, or other financial resources) for enforcement and repression | | |
| 1 | Military Expenditure per Soldier according to SIPRI (constant 2015 USD divided by population) | 0 |
| 2 | Military Expenditure per Capita according to SIPRI (current USD) | 0 |
| 3 | U.S. Humanitarian Aid Disbursements to Country according to USAID (USD) | 0 |
| 4 | Military Aid Disbursements to Country by U.S. according to USAID (USD) | 0 |
| 5 | Military Expenditure as Percentage of GDP according to SIPRI | 0 |
| Area Subtotal | | 0 |

/32

| | | |
|--|---|---|
| Risk Area 2: Structural Factors | | |
| Level of Violence | | |
| 6 | Political Terror Scale Average Score according to Amnesty International and DoS scores (1-5) | 0 |
| 7 | Percentile Rank of Worldwide Governance Indicator: Political Stability and Absence of Violence and Terrorism | 0 |
| 8 | Number of Consecutive Years w/out Internal Conflict according to Center for Systemic Peace | 0 |
| 9 | Combined Magnitude of Existing Internal Conflict according to Center for Systemic Peace | 0 |
| Subtotal | | 0 |
| Personal and Political Freedoms | | |
| 10 | Score for World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index's sub-factor: Right to Life and Security of Person Effectively Guaranteed | 0 |
| 11 | Civil Liberties Score according to Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report | 0 |
| 12 | Press Freedom Index according to Reporters Without Borders | 0 |
| 13 | Are there Reports of Political Prisoners in the DoS Country Report on Human Rights Practices? | 0 |
| 14 | Political Rights Score according to Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report | 0 |
| 15 | Level of Competition for Political Office with data from the Center for Systemic Peace's Polity IV project | 0 |

/34

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|------|
| Subtotal | | | 0 | /24 |
| Economic Factors | | | | |
| 16 | Foreign Aid to Country according to OECD (in millions of current USD) | | 0 | |
| 17 | Business Freedom Score according to Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom | | 0 | |
| 18 | Income Bracket according to World Bank (Low, Low Middle, Upper Middle, High) | | 0 | |
| 19 | Personal Remittances as Percentage of GDP according to World Bank | % | 0 | |
| 20 | Public Services Score according to Fund for Peace's Fragile States Index | | 0 | |
| 21 | U.S. Economic Aid Disbursements (non-military) to Country according to USAID (USD) | | 0 | |
| 22 | Resource Rents (primary commodities) as Percentage of GDP according to World Bank | % | 0 | |
| Macroeconomic indicators | | | | |
| 23 | GDP per Capita according to the World Bank (current USD) | | 0 | |
| 24 | Poverty Rate as Percentage of Population according to World Bank | % | 0 | |
| 25 | Inflation Rate as Annual Percentage according to World Bank | % | 0 | |
| 26 | Unemployment as Percentage of Population according to World Bank | % | 0 | |
| Subtotal | | | 0 | /24 |
| International trade | | | | |
| 27 | Trade Freedom Score according to Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom | | 0 | |
| 28 | Exports of Goods and Services as Percentage of GDP according to World Bank | % | 0 | |
| 29 | Export Diversification Index according to IMF | | 0 | |
| 30 | Combined Value of Imports and Exports with Bordering Countries as Percentage of GDP according to International Trade Centre | % | 0 | |
| 31 | Current Account Balance as Percentage of GDP according to World Bank | % | 0 | |
| 32 | Is the Country an Oil Exporter? | | 0 | |
| 33 | Manufacturing Exports as Percentage of Merchandise Exports according to World Bank | % | 0 | |
| Subtotal | | | 0 | /26 |
| Economic Subtotal | | | 0 | /105 |
| Environmental Factors | | | | |
| 34 | Kilogram of Oil Consumption per Capita according to World Bank | | 0 | |
| 35 | Percentage of Land Area in Agricultural Use according to World Bank | % | 0 | |
| 36 | Percentage of Land Area with > 50% Loss of Canopy according to Global Forest Watch | % | 0 | |
| Subtotal | | | 0 | /16 |
| Societal Make-up and Population Statistics | | | | |
| 37 | Is the Youth Population (Ages 15-24) over 20% of Total Population? (Youth Bulge) | | 0 | |
| 38 | Agricultural Workforce as Percentage of Total Employed Population according to World Bank | % | 0 | |
| 39 | Urban Population as Percentage of Total according to World Bank | % | 0 | |
| 40 | Urbanization Growth Rate as Annual Percentage according to World Bank | % | 0 | |
| 41 | Is there Persecution of Indigenous Peoples as Reported by UNHCR or Minority Rights Group? | | 0 | |

| | | | | | |
|----|---|--|---|----------|-------------|
| 42 | Population Density (people/sq. km of land area) according to World Bank | | | 0 | |
| 43 | Is 20% of the Population or More Minority Ethnic Groups? | | | 0 | |
| 44 | Is there a Religious Majority? | | | 0 | |
| 45 | Population Growth Rate as Annual Percentage according to World Bank | | % | 0 | |
| | Subtotal | | | 0 | /42 |
| | Health Factors | | | | |
| 46 | Health Expenditure per Capita according to World Bank (current USD) | | | 0 | |
| 47 | Food Security Score according to Global Food Security Index | | | 0 | |
| 48 | Percentage of Population with Access to Water according to World Bank | | % | 0 | |
| 49 | Percentage of Population with Access to Sanitation according to World Bank | | % | 0 | |
| 50 | Life Expectancy according to World Bank | | | 0 | |
| 51 | Infant Mortality per 1,000 Child Births according to World Bank | | | 0 | |
| 52 | Maternal Mortality per 100,000 Child Births according to World Bank | | | 0 | |
| 53 | Kilocalories per Capita per Day according to Our World in Data | | | 0 | |
| | Subtotal | | | 0 | /58 |
| | Respect for Rights and Freedoms of Women and Children | | | | |
| 54 | Literacy Rate (Percentage of Total Population above 15) according to World Bank | | % | 0 | |
| 55 | Is Abortion Prohibited Altogether or Permitted Only to Save Woman's Life? | | | 0 | |
| 56 | Ratio of Girls to Boys Enrolled at Primary and Secondary Levels at Public and Private Schools according to World Bank | | | 0 | |
| | Subtotal | | | 0 | /24 |
| | Area Subtotal | | | 0 | /303 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|--|---|----------|------------|
| Risk Area 3: Triggering Factors | | | | | |
| Declaration of state of emergency or special security measures that restrict the citizens' rights and pushback by citizens against government policy | | | | | |
| 57 | Is there a declared state of emergency? | | | 0 | |
| 58 | Are there Reports of Current Anti-Government Demonstrations? | | | 0 | |
| | Subtotal | | | 0 | /6 |
| Spillover effects of instability, tensions from conflicts in neighboring countries | | | | | |
| 59 | Refugees Produced as Percent of Population according to UNHCR | | % | 0 | |
| 60 | Refugees Hosted as Percent of Population according to UNHCR | | % | 0 | |
| | Subtotal | | | 0 | /13 |
| | Area Subtotal | | | 0 | /19 |

| | | | | | |
|--|--|--|--|---|--|
| Risk Area 4: Record of Past GVHRs | | | | | |
| Past or present commission of GVHRs, which include extrajudicial killings, torture, enforced disappearances, and rape | | | | | |
| 61 | Are there Reports of Extrajudicial Killings? | | | 0 | |
| 62 | Are there Reports of Torture? | | | 0 | |

| | | | |
|---|---|--|--------------|
| 63 | Are there Reports of Enforced Disappearances? | | 0 |
| 64 | Are there Reports of Rape? | | 0 |
| Subtotal | | | 0 /25 |
| Lack of mass pushback in the face of ongoing GVHRs, absence of transitional justice or lack of initiatives for inclusivity and reconciliation following a conflict | | | |
| 65 | Score for World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index's sub-factor: People Do Not Resort to Violence to Redress Personal Grievances | | 0 |
| Subtotal | | | 0 /6 |
| Impunity for evident GVHRs | | | |
| 66 | Percentile Rank of Worldwide Governance Indicator: Rule of Law | | 0 |
| Subtotal | | | 0 /11 |
| Area Subtotal | | | 0 /42 |

| Risk Area 5: Weakness of State Institutions | | | |
|---|--|--|--------------|
| Absence of legal framework that prevents GVHRs through the ratification of international human rights treaties | | | |
| 67 | Did the Country Sign AND NOT Ratify ICPPED? | | 0 |
| 68 | Did the Country Sign AND NOT Ratify Convention Against Torture? | | 0 |
| Subtotal | | | 0 /5 |
| Corruption and governance | | | |
| 69 | Percentile Rank of Worldwide Governance Indicator: Regulatory Quality | | 0 |
| 70 | Percentile Rank of Worldwide Governance Indicator: Control of Corruption | | 0 |
| 71 | Percentile Rank of Worldwide Governance Indicator: Government Effectiveness | | 0 |
| 72 | Percentile Rank of Worldwide Governance Indicator: Voice and Accountability | | 0 |
| 73 | Number of Years since Most Recent Major Regime Change according to Center for Systemic Peace | | 0 |
| 74 | Are there Ungoverned Spaces within the Country? | | 0 |
| 75 | Level of Democracy Score according to Center for Systemic Peace | | 0 |
| 76 | Government Expenditure as Percentage of GDP according to World Bank | | 0 % |
| 77 | Is the Country not an Electoral Democracy now, but was at one Time Prior? | | 0 |
| Subtotal | | | 0 /55 |
| Area Subtotal | | | 0 /60 |

Country Risk Score Profile

0
Very Low

Brazil Case Study

Introduction

In 2014, Brazil was plagued by chronic human rights violations including unlawful killings, prison overcrowding, and the torture and ill-treatment of detainees. Amnesty International's research reveals that military police officers were responsible for a significant percentage of these abuses. As an illustration, in 2014, the number of killings by police officers went up to more than 3,000, according to official data compiled by the non-governmental organization Brazilian Forum on Public Security. In 2014, killings by on-duty police officers doubled in São Paulo, the state with the largest population in Brazil. In Rio de Janeiro, the state with the highest rate of killings by police, 569 people died at the hands of on-duty officers from January to October 2015, an increase of 18 percent over the same period in 2014. This rate increased 11 percent in 2015 and an additional 23 percent in the first nine months of 2016. According to a survey in the 2016 edition of the Brazilian Yearbook of Public Security, nine people were killed due to police intervention every day in the country during a single year.

History (last 10-15 years)

Between 2006 and 2015, over 8,000 cases of killings by on-duty police officers were registered in the state of Rio de Janeiro.²⁰ Over the last 20 years, São Paulo's military police killed 11,358 people, according to data from the São Paulo Military Police Intelligence Center. In São Paulo, the military police are responsible for maintaining public order and working to prevent crimes, while the civilian police concentrate on criminal investigations. According to quarterly statistics released by the São Paulo Public Security Department— not including so-called “suspicious deaths”— the civil and military police in the state were responsible for 4,892 killings between 2007 and 2015, an average of 1.5 per day. In the first quarters of both 2015 and 2016, there were 201 such killings, the highest number for a first quarter since 2003. According to Human Rights Watch, “Police in the state of Rio de Janeiro have killed more than 8,000 people in the past decade, including at least 645 people in 2015. One fifth of all homicides in the city of Rio last year were police killings. Three quarters of those killed by police were black men.”²¹

Areas of Risk

1. Capacity

Even though the military police are not part of the armed forces, they are expected to maintain operation principles according to the military principles of rank and discipline. The military police in São Paulo have been granted formidable amounts of power that have allowed them to carry out such atrocities. They are the largest state police force in the country, with over 100,000 personnel in their ranks who are distributed across each of the 40 cities and towns that encompass the greater São Paulo region.

²⁰ “Brazil: National Report,” United Nations, May 05, 2017.

²¹ “Police Violence and Torture in Brazil,” Conectas, October 06, 2017.

A recent study by a police captain from Paraíba State, Fabio França, uncovered systemic abuses suffered by recruits during training, including sleep deprivation, beatings, bullying, and the use of tear gas. França, who holds a PhD in sociology, gathered reports of recruits in an unnamed state, describing their treatment as "rituals of suffering."²² While Brazil's overall military expenditure per soldier is not particularly high, the concentration of spending, specifically on São Paulo's military police, is a likely factor of high levels of violations as well.

2. Structural Factors

Brazil scored highest in the structural factors risk area, signifying that their GVHRs are likely correlated with existing conditions within their own society. The institutionalization of human rights violations within the military police during training has a direct impact on how police interact with the general population. An account by the State of São Paulo Truth Commission offers a telling example. During testimony before the commission in November 2013, sociologist and ex-secretary of public security in Rio de Janeiro state, Luiz Eduardo Soares, said: "The military police elite squad in Rio [known as BOPE] offered classes in torture until 2006, 2006! Classes in torture! I am not just referring to ideological whims... we are talking about institutional procedures."²³ Levels of violence within Brazil have remained comparatively high, and since the spike in 2012, have consistently ranked as some of the highest in the world. They have only experienced thirty-three consecutive years of peace which is comparatively low versus non-GVHR committing countries. The levels of violence, in part conducted by the military police in São Paulo, led to high rankings for political terror, stability, and absence of violence and terrorism.

3. Triggering Factors

Over the past years, in anticipation of global events hosted by Brazil, the authorities planned and implemented measures that created an environment conducive to the commission of gross violations of human rights.

In 2014, when Brazil hosted the World Cup, "homicides resulting from police operations rose 40%" in Rio alone, according to Amnesty International. That increase in police killings continued: there were 580 recorded police-related deaths in 2014 and 645 in 2015.

In 2016, the Brazilian government passed two laws that actually decrease accountability for law enforcement— an Antiterrorism Law and a General Law of the Olympics, both of which could be used by police to justify the use of force against protesters or anyone considered a threat. According to Amnesty International, military troops were also sent in to head up operations in favelas, a strategy that led to more violations because the soldiers in Brazil are not trained to handle public safety tasks. And in 2014, when the soldiers were deployed to favelas for the 2014

²² Cirro Barros, "Is Brazil's Military Police Training Too Brutal?," July 18, 2015. <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/is-brazil-military-police-training-too-brutal>.

²³ Ibid.

World Cup, they stayed long after the games.²⁴ In December 2015, the United Nations accused Brazilian police forces of systematically murdering poor black street children in an effort to “clean the streets” for the Olympics.

4. Record of Past GVHRs

Throughout its history, Brazil has experienced the commission of GVHRs that have not been prosecuted or punished. This legacy of past GVHRs has not been fairly addressed through accountability, transitional justice, or other mechanisms, and thus represents a risk of future violations of human rights.

Brazil was under military rule between 1964 and 1985. This period was marked by concentrated and arbitrary power in the executive, whereby the state’s security structures used violence as the primary means of conflict management. Repression and elimination of political opponents became state policy, designed and implemented from decisions emanating from the presidency of the republic and military ministries,”²⁵ Accountability for the GVHRs committed by agents of the military dictatorship in Brazil (1964-1985) have, on the whole, been extremely limited.²⁶ The 1979 law states that neither military officials accused of torture nor left-wing guerrillas accused of violence can face prosecution. In a 2014 report, the National Truth Commission created by the President found that human rights violations during military rule, from 1964 to 1985, were “widespread and systematic,” and planned by officials at the highest level. The Commission revealed that “illegal arrests, torture, executions, and forced disappearances were performed systematically by state agents under Brazil’s military rule.” Additionally, the report identified 377 individuals responsible for abuses, including torture, killings, and enforced disappearances.

The Truth Commission concludes that human rights violations such as illegal and arbitrary arrests, executions, torture, and forced disappearances continue today because the crimes committed under military rule were not denounced, investigated, or punished.²⁷

Even after the return to democracy, Brazil’s 1988 Constitution kept the security structure of the military years, with two separate police forces: the Civil Police, responsible for investigating crimes, and the Military Police, responsible for policing the streets.²⁸ Indeed, one of the main conclusions in the Truth Commission’s report is precisely the continuation of violations despite the significant political changes that Brazil has undergone since the country’s transition to democracy. But, beyond the lack of accountability for contemporary violations committed by individual police officers and commanders, a broader lack of political accountability exists.

²⁴ Prakash, Nidhi. “The Rio Olympics Are Going to be a Complete Disaster for Human Rights, According to Experts.” *Splinter News*, June 03, 2016. <https://splinternews.com/the-rio-olympics-are-going-to-be-a-complete-disaster-fo-1793857253>.

²⁵ “Brazil Truth Commission: Torture, Executions Amounted to State Policy,” *Al Jazeera*, December 10, 2014. <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/12/10/brazil-truth-commission.html>.

²⁶ “Security Sector Reform in Brazil,” BICC.

²⁷ “Brazil Truth Commission: Abuse Rife Under Military Rule,” *BBC News*, December 10, 2014. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-30410741>.

²⁸ Julia Carneiro, “Brazil Security Forces Criticized Over Policing Methods,” *BBC Brazil*, July 23, 2013, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-23418063>.

Political and economic elites in Brazil have, for decades, supported and legitimized repressive policing in ways that have undercut most attempts to reform its security forces.²⁹

The lack of reaction in the face of ongoing GVHRs and the flagrant impunity for the evident commission of GVHRs continue to plague Brazil's security forces. These factors represent predictive indicators of future violations of human rights by security forces. Law enforcement officers have continuously used torture and have generally enjoyed widespread immunity.³⁰ Repression and lack of accountability continue to be the hallmark of Brazil's security forces.

According to Amnesty International, there is a little effort to hold police officials accountable for their abusive behavior during public protests. Although some local officials, for example in São Paulo, have announced internal investigations into allegations of police violence during protests, to date the results of such investigations have not been made public. According to the 2014 Amnesty International Report, no police officers are known to have been subjected to criminal or disciplinary proceedings following the violence in 2014.

5. Weakness of State Institutions

The lack of appropriate institutions that are governed by the rule of law and good governance practices is among the factors that encourage the occurrence of GVHRs. Evidence has shown that security forces in Brazil take advantage of this weakness to commit abuses on vulnerable populations.

According to analysts and international human rights organizations, one of the reasons for the high level of gross human rights violations in Brazil is the nature and status of the law enforcement institutions. It should be recalled that law enforcement activities in Brazil are performed by two categories of police forces. The first category is the federal police which operate under the Ministry of Justice oversight. It has an investigative role and plays a minor role in the law enforcement. The second category is the state police. Most police forces fall under this category and are divided into two distinct units: the civil police (some 123,403 members), which has an investigative role, and the military police (over 400,000 active members), which is in charge of maintaining order and preventing crime. They are police with some military characteristics and privileges, including a separate judicial system.³¹ They continued to rely on a militarized approach for law enforcement, including through training and equipment. Moreover, they remain attached to national military structures, including the military courts. By being part of the Brazilian army, the Military Police does not respond to the common justice regarding crimes such as homicide or bodily injury. As a result, serious human rights violations perpetrated by the police have been hidden and underreported. Bodily injury numbers often include non-reported cases of torture. The procedure to prove an act of torture (which involves a forensic medical certificate) is very rarely available to the victims of police misconduct.

²⁹ Pag Engstrom, "Challenging Impunity in Brazil," Wordpress.com, October 03, 2016, <https://parengstrom.wordpress.com/2016/03/10/challenging-impunity-in-brazil/>.

³⁰ https://www.bicc.de/ssr_gtz/pdf/brazil.pdf.

³¹ <https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/The-State-of-Security-and-Justice-in-Brazil-Reviewing-the-Evidence.pdf>.

The two categories of state police forces have distinct institutional histories, which also reflect the patterns of police misconduct and the specific limitation of oversight mechanisms. A UN Special Rapporteur, upon a country visit to Brazil, noted that police violence against civilians was widespread and military police officers were committing the majority of killings. The division of labor and professional rivalry are just two of the factors that complicate establishing a single disciplinary and oversight institution.³²

Another reason for GVHRs by security forces in Brazil is the lack of an independent and impartial judicial system. Although Brazil's Constitution provides for an independent judiciary, the reality is that it has been plagued with inefficiencies, particularly at the state level, and subject to political and economic influences. The judiciary remains the least supervised of the three branches of the government. It is often subject to intimidation and other external influences, especially in rural areas, and public complaints over its inefficiency are frequent. Access to justice also varies greatly due to Brazil's income inequality. This results in a low public faith in the justice institutions.³³

In particular, the lack of accountability and sizeable discretion given to police officers encourage police violence. An Amnesty International report identifies the flaws in the criminal justice system that contribute to police violence. The report identifies the lack of independent bodies to receive complaints. It also points out the limited protection for victims or witnesses of human rights violations, as well as limited access to justice. Since the majority of victims come from marginalized classes, they have difficulty accessing the justice system; even if they succeed, the process is very slow and the victims are highly unlikely to win their case.³⁴ According to UN figures, more than 2,000 people are killed by the police each year. Torture is used systematically to extract confessions from suspects, and extrajudicial killings are portrayed as shootouts with dangerous criminals. Police officers are rarely prosecuted for abuses, and those charged are almost never convicted.³⁵ According to Amnesty International's research, military police regularly used unnecessary and excessive force during security operations in the city's favelas. The majority of victims of police killings are young black men of between 15 and 29 years of age. Such killings are hardly investigated. When a person is killed as a result of police intervention, a civil police officer files an administrative report to determine if the killing was in self-defense or if a criminal prosecution is required. In practice, many cases are filed as "resistance followed by death," which prevents independent investigations and shields the perpetrators from the civilian courts.³⁶

The high level of corruption and poor governance represent other factors conducive to gross human rights violations by security forces. While the Brazilian police work in dangerous conditions and have suffered budget cuts, it is widely accepted that corruption remains endemic

³² https://www.bicc.de/ssr_gtz/pdf/brazil.pdf.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Moon, Kyra. "Political Violence in Brazil," in *Human Rights and Human Welfare*. 116-131.

³⁵ "Brazil: Freedom House World Report," Freedom House, 2014.

³⁶ Amnesty International. "Brazil: 'Trigger happy' military police kill hundreds as Rio prepares for Olympic countdown." August 3, 2015. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/08/brazil-trigger-happy-military-police-kill-hundreds-as-rio-prepares-for-olympic-countdown/>.

in the country's law enforcement institutions.³⁷

The lack of training is another indicator that explains why military police killings have increased notably in the two largest cities (São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro) of Brazil. More specifically, the violent training explains why the Brazilian military police is the one known for most kills and most murdered in the world. This situation is exacerbated by the long-term effects of the brutal training regime that members of the military police must undergo. The police agents are inserted inside a rigid hierarchy, being subject to violent training, ill-treatment, and unreasonable punishment, as is typical within the army. Recent studies indicate recurring abuses suffered by recruits during training, including sleep deprivation, beatings, bullying, and the use of tear gas.

Last but not least, significant institutional weakness is the lack of civilian oversight of the security forces. Brazil has so far been moderately successful in establishing legitimate civilian-controlled security sector institutions.³⁸

Conclusion

Although Brazil was the second lowest scoring of the GVHR countries tested, it still scored highly in the risk areas of Structural Factors Record of Past GVHRs and Weakness of State Institutions. On par with all other GVHR committing countries, Brazil received a score of eleven for all indicators that hold that value, and the country should focus on these in order to improve upon its overall risk score.

For some indicators, Brazil was found to be an outlier from the rest of the sample. For example, Brazil did not receive risk points for the indicators of regime stability, civil liberties, or press freedom. Nevertheless, the final score was significant: the level of gravity and the number of GVHRs committed in Brazil in 2014 was particularly high. This means that other factors had a greater weight on the total risk than for other countries and that there may be lurking variables that the global tool was not able to cover. For instance, the Olympic games in Rio may have represented specific features. While approaching the case study, it became clear that the specificities of particular countries always need to be taken into account in order to provide a full picture regarding the factors that led to GVHRs.

Brazil scored low in the subcategories of Personal and Political Freedoms and in Health Factors, indicating that in these areas Brazil is performing better. Where Brazil was unique, focusing on the indicators for which they scored highly and that were less likely to produce scores for GVHR countries, were economic factors. Although not as predictive as other indicators, Brazil recorded a score on nearly every economic indicator. For example, Brazil received points for six out of the seven International Trade indicators, even though the highest weight an International Trade indicator holds is nine points, while all others are scored four points or less.

³⁷ Will Worley, "Brazil saw more violent deaths than civil-war torn Syria in 2015, report says," *The Independent*, October 29, 2016, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/brazil-deaths-violent-crime-syria-police-brutality-report-brazilian-forum-for-public-security-a7386296.html>.

³⁸ Denise Garcia, "Not yet a democracy: establishing civilian authority over the security sector in Brazil – lessons for other countries in transition," 487-504, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2014.893489>.

Iraq Case Study

Introduction

2014 was a pivotal year in Iraq's ongoing humanitarian crisis. With the Islamic State takeover of Mosul on June 10, the Iraqi state, for all practical purposes, had collapsed. According to a Human Rights Watch report, Iraq experienced an increase in suicide attacks, car bombs, summary executions, indiscriminate attacks by government forces on civilian areas, arbitrary arrests, torture in detention, disappearances, kidnapping, summary executions, sexual assault and slavery of Yezidi women and girls, and killings and kidnappings of members of religious and ethnic minorities. More than 12,000 people were killed and some 22,000 were injured during 2014. By the end of the year, nearly a million Iraqis were internally displaced. With respect to the Iraqi security forces, according to Human Rights Watch, GVHRs were limited to illegally detaining of women, many of whom were subjected to torture and ill-treatment, including sexual abuse. When juxtaposed with the violations committed by ISIS and Iraq's Shiite militias, the GVHRs attributable to the Iraqi security forces is but a fraction.

Context

Some of the same factors contributing to the perpetration of GVHRs in 2014 can be found in some form going back to the founding of the Iraqi state in 1921. This Shiite-majority country was ruled by a succession of Sunni Hashemite monarchies until the coup of 1958. A series of struggles over the next two decades, largely within the Sunni Ba'ath Party, were followed by the takeover of Saddam Hussein in 1979. The Shiite-led government resulting from the U.S.-led invasion in 2003 was the first since the eighteenth century. In short, Iraq's sectarian tensions of the twenty-first century are not a recent development.

This tension has significantly increased since the withdrawal of American troops in 2011, as Iraq has seen some extraordinary developments. The power vacuum left by U.S. forces was initially filled by the sectarian and authoritarian tendencies of Prime Minister Anwar al-Maliki. When Iraq's Sunni population responded with peaceful protests, an increasingly insecure Maliki fired back with violent crackdowns focused primarily in Sunni Anbar province. The crackdowns, along with Maliki's purging of the government's Sunni leadership, were met with a wave of car bombings at a rate not seen since the height of the civil war in 2006.

Although multiple actors were involved in the violence, the most notable turned out to be a little-known al-Qaeda splinter group: the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. With an ambitious leadership, the group quickly established itself in Iraq, gaining control of the city of Fallujah by the end of 2013. Iraq's internal unrest, coupled with the civil war in neighboring Syria, culminated in the virtual evaporation of the Iraqi-Syrian border, and ISIS' takeover of Mosul, Iraq's second largest city, in June 2014. Assuming that the weakening of state institutions, leading to the ultimate breakdown of the state, are indicative of human rights violations, a terrorist organization running a military force out of a large city most certainly falls within that category.

Multiple Sunni non-state actors, in addition to ISIS, were involved in the violence, including the 1920 Revolution Brigade, the Naqshbandi Army, among others. The threat coming from the Shiite side of the ledger, however, was no less potent. Indeed, in May 2015, General David Petraeus told the *Washington Post* that “the foremost threat to Iraq’s long-term stability and broader regional equilibrium is not the Islamic State; rather, it is the Shiite militias, many backed by - and some guided by - Iran.”³⁹ Notably, Petraeus made this assertion during what was perhaps the high-point of ISIS’ power. In short, the magnitude of the chaos seen across Iraq and Syria since 2012, leading to the collapse of both states, cannot be overstated. Again, factors contributing to the weakening, or complete breakdown, of the state and its monopoly on the use of force, contributes to the likelihood of GVHRs.

Given this context, the Iraqi security forces’ recent human rights record is unclear. While Baghdad was undoubtedly responsible for the majority of human rights violations in the two years following the withdrawal of American troops, by 2014 the situation is not as clear-cut. With the Iraqi Army hardly putting up a fight in the face of the ISIS takeover of Mosul, it was the Shiite militias who had the greatest impact in the battles against ISIS from 2014 onward. In fact, since 2014, the greatest number of GVHRs in Iraq were committed not by the Iraqi security forces, but by non-state actors, ISIS, and the Shiite militias.

Areas of Risk

1. Capacity

In July 2014, Iraq’s security forces of more than 270,000 personnel were reported to be among the largest in the Middle East (only Egypt and Iran were bigger).⁴⁰ The 2013 edition of the IISS Military Balance reported that the police forces had a total authorized strength of 531,000 in early 2013, with 302,000 in the Iraqi Police Service, 44,000 in the paramilitary Iraqi Federal Police, 60,000 in Border Enforcement, 95,000 in the Facilities Protection Service, and 60,000 in the Oil Police.⁴¹

A contrast of the government crackdowns in Anbar Province with the lackluster performance of the military during the fall of Mosul provides a telling illustration of the Iraqi security forces. There existed the manpower and military hardware to conduct airstrikes and other types of indiscriminate attacks on civilian areas, along with the ability to make massive numbers of arbitrary arrests and perform torture in detention. However, the Iraqi Army’s abrupt retreat - despite being outfitted with U.S. military hardware - from Mosul in June 2014, from a group of fighters in pickup trucks, was a clear demonstration of the military’s inability to act as a competent fighting force. A lack of the necessary command structure and an effective Ministry of Defense only contributed to its incapacity.

³⁹ Liz Sly, “Petraeus: The Islamic State isn’t our biggest problem in Iraq,” *The Washington Post*, March 20, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/03/20/petraeus-the-islamic-state-isnt-our-biggest-problem-in-iraq/?utm_term=.3f61f0d8dbda.

⁴⁰ Sam Jones and Borzou Daragahi, “Iraq’s security forces ill-equipped to face militants,” *Financial Times*, July 10, 2014, <https://www.ft.com/content/a089e41e-081c-11e4-9afc-00144feab7de>.

⁴¹ “World Report 2015: Iraq,” Human Rights Watch, 2015, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/iraq>.

For their part, the police forces included some strong paramilitary groups, but the combination of regular forces with counterinsurgency elements did not have the support of effective courts, a fully functional criminal system, or working detention facilities. In addition, the Minister of Interior was less prepared and highly politicized.⁴²

Moreover, corruption was rampant at multiple levels but especially in the police and its relations with political brokers. A 2013 Human Rights Report from the State Department underlines “a culture of impunity largely protected members of the security services, as well as those elsewhere in the government, from investigation and successful prosecution for human rights violations. Corruption among officials across government agencies was widespread and contributed to significant human rights abuses.”⁴³

2. Structural Factors

Iraq’s demography is often thought of as being neatly divided into three zones: the Sunni in the west, Shi’a in the south, and Kurds in the north. While Iraq’s makeup has historically been more complex, since the height of the civil war in 2006, the makeup of these three enclaves is not all that far off from the more simplistic description above.

Dexter Filkins nicely captured the recent evolution of this dynamic: “The fantastic bloodletting of the civil war...turned neighborhoods that for centuries had harbored both Sunni and Shiite Muslims into confessional pure enclaves. Roughly speaking, Sunnis moved to the west of Baghdad and Shiites to the east. These days, whatever can be found in the city is owed in part to the relentless segregation that took place during the civil war.”

Along with these highly fractured internal divisions, Iraq’s geographical position in the region has also been a source of internal unrest. For the better part of the last twenty-five years, there were just three countries on the U.S. State Department’s list of state sponsors of terror. Two of the three border Iraq— Iran to the east and Syria to the west. Moreover, both Iran and Syria have been fierce rivals of Iraq. The Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s was one of the bloodiest in the modern history of the Middle East. As for Syria, it was Damascus that housed the Middle East’s only other Ba’ath Party for the latter half of the twentieth century. These two minority governments were in constant competition in their quest for leadership in the arena of Arab nationalism.

After the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, Damascus was a virtual gateway for Sunni jihadis making their way to fight in Iraq. The Assad government was not shy in this effort, releasing Sunni fighters from Syrian prisons and ferrying them to the Iraqi border. As for Iran, IRGC troops were directly involved on the ground with various Shiite groups in Iraq. Despite any sectarian agendas, both Tehran and Damascus shared the same goal of causing unrest in Iraq.

⁴² Anthony Cordesman and Sam Khazai, “Shaping Iraq’s Security Forces,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/140612_Shaping_Iraq_Security_Forces.pdf.

⁴³ “Iraq 2013 Human Rights Report,” United States Department of State, 1-2, <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220565.pdf>.

3. Triggering Factors

Less than twenty-four hours after the final American troops had been withdrawn in December 2011, Prime Minister Maliki ordered the arrest of Vice President Tariq Hashemi, the highest-ranking Sunni Arab. Without any American supervision, Maliki's sectarian tendencies had been unleashed. As Dexter Filkins wrote in 2014, "Maliki began an aggressive campaign to crackdown on dissent – especially Sunni dissent – and to centralize authority in his office." State institutions, including the judiciary, were systematically undermined. Sectarian tensions skyrocketed. The professional leadership of the Iraqi army was eviscerated, purged in favor of Maliki loyalists.

This included rampant corruption throughout the government. According to Filkins, allegations of corruption include tales of extortion, bribery, kickbacks, theft, and the siphoning of Iraq's oil revenues. One former senior C.I.A. official went so far to categorize the level of corruption as "Olympian."⁴⁴

The Sunni protest movement began shortly after the arrest of Hashemi and many other Sunni leaders in the government. What began as peaceful protests gradually evolved into violent clashes, mostly taking place in Sunni Anbar province. Throughout 2013, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, not very well known at the time, increased its presence in Fallujah, eventually gaining de facto control of the city by the end of 2013.⁴⁵ By December 2013, Iraq was facing a full-blown insurgency.

While Iraq was facing its own internal unrest, neighboring Syria was in a state of civil war. Compounding concerns over Maliki's sectarian agenda, as Iran increased its efforts in Syria, regular transports of guns and fighters to Damascus passed "unmolested" through Iraqi airspace. This only enhanced the perception of Maliki being in the pocket of the Iranian regime. Whether real or perceived, Iraq's Sunni population found one reason after another to see Maliki as a tool of Iran with a sectarian agenda. It was this very perception that was a significant factor in the Sunni protests in Anbar in 2012 and 2013, which were met with indiscriminate attacks on civilians and arbitrary arrests by Maliki's government. Of course, all of this led to the defining moment of 2014: ISIS' conquering of Mosul and a third of the country, including the outskirts of Baghdad, eventually triggering the emergency deployment of U.S. troops.

4. Record of Past GVHRs

Saddam Hussein ruled Iraq for more than three decades under one of the most repressive regimes of the twentieth century. This included the consistent use of torture methods and extrajudicial killings. Saddam also resorted to the use of chemical weapons. In 1988, during the final days of the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam killed between 3,200 and 5,000 people in the Kurdish city of Halabja.⁴⁶ Then, following the Gulf War in 1991, Saddam responded to uprisings in both the

⁴⁴ Filkins, Dexter, "What We Left Behind," *The New Yorker*, April 28, 2014, <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/04/28/what-we-left-behind>.

⁴⁵ Kirk H. Sowell, "Maliki's Anbar Blunder," *Foreign Policy*, January 15, 2014, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/15/maliki-anbar-blunder/>.

⁴⁶ "1988: Thousands die in Halabja gas attack," *BBC*, Accessed November 01, 2017, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/16/newsid_4304000/4304853.stm.

Kurdish north and Shiite south with brutal crackdowns. Saddam's forces detained thousands of "suspects," many of whom were tortured, raped, or burned alive.⁴⁷ The estimates vary, but up to 10,000 Iraqis were killed by Saddam's forces in the wake of the Gulf War.⁴⁸

Ten years after the fall of Saddam Hussein's dictatorship, human rights abuses returned, and grave violations continued throughout the years. Commission of torture and other ill-treatments, many of which resulted in death of detainees in Ramadi, Karbala, and Sulaymaniyah, were registered. In 2012, accounts of the hanging of prisoners and others languishing on death row were made public. Thousands of Iraqis "were detained without trial or served prison sentences imposed after unfair trials;" torture remained widespread, and was committed with impunity.⁴⁹

5. *Weakness of State Institutions*

Through 2011, the foundation and legitimacy of Iraq's major state institutions rested with the American military. After the pullout of the final U.S. troops in December 2011, these institutions quickly spiraled out of control. This included the frailty of the Iraqi security forces, the rapid deterioration of the judiciary, and what turned out to be illegitimate elections at the local and national levels. According to a report issued by the Institute for the Study of War in April 2013, "The national unity government that formed in the wake of the 2010 parliamentary elections [had] given way to a de-facto majoritarian government in which Maliki [had] a monopoly on the institutions of the state." The report went on to note that "the judiciary has been an accomplice to the centralization of power by Prime Minister Maliki through a series of controversial rulings that have empowered the executive and restrained or removed his political rivals."⁵⁰

Other prominent examples of the weakening of state institutions include the following:

- **Iraqi High Electoral Commissions:** The IHEC administers Iraq's elections and ensures impartiality of the electoral process. The Maliki government made repeated attempts to undermine the commission. In March 2013, Maliki postponed provincial elections in Ninawa and Anbar Provinces without consultation from the IHEC. The elections of 2013 were the first to be held after the U.S. troops had withdrawn in December 2011. John Hannah of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies captures the impact of the U.S. absence with this: "There is no doubt that America's heavy involvement during past elections helped deter fraud. Absence that involvement, the risk of wrongdoing – or simply the perception of wrongdoing – increased dramatically."⁵¹
- **Central Bank of Iraq (CBI):** After multiples clashes with Maliki, the CBI head was removed on charges of corruption.

⁴⁷ Human Rights Watch, "Justice For Iraq: A Human Rights Watch Policy Paper," December 2002, <http://www.mafhoum.com/press4/126S23.htm>.

⁴⁸ John F. Burns, "Uncovering Iraq's Horrors in Desert Graves," *The New York Times*, June 05, 2006, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/05/world/middleeast/05grave.html>.

⁴⁹ Amnesty International, "Iraq: A Decade of Abuses," April 9, 2013, <https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/iraq-a-decade-of-abuses/>.

⁵⁰ Marissa Sullivan, "Maliki's Authoritarian Regime," April 2013, <http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Malikis-Authoritarian-Regime-Web.pdf>.

⁵¹ John Hannah, "Previewing Iraq's provincial elections," *Foreign Policy*, November 01, 2017, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/18/previewing-iraqs-provincial-elections/>.

- Integrity Commission (IC): The IC was responsible for preventing and investigating corruption within the government. The IC regularly faced interference from Maliki's office. Two directors resigned, citing this very interference. Maliki eventually appointed a close ally to head the commission.⁵²

The weakening and politicization of these institutions contributed to the breakdown of the Iraqi state, along with an extreme level of chaos. This led to the rise of ISIS and the increased influence of Tehran and its Shiite militias. The failures of the judiciary in particular gave way to an environment of impunity.

Conclusion

Despite the existence of numerous indicators prevalent in other cases examined herein, there are multiple factors unique to the case of Iraq. For one, no other country since Vietnam has been occupied by a U.S. presence as large as 165,000 troops— not once, but twice, if one includes the 500,000 U.S. troops involved in Operation Desert Storm in 1991. The impact on the risk of human rights abuses resulting from the abrupt departure from the weak Iraqi state and abandonment of a nascent government, cannot be overstated. Afghanistan, with 100,000 troops deployed there at the height of the conflict, would be a natural case to compare to Iraq in this regard, but was not included in the sample set of 30 countries for this report.

Another ingredient in the recent chaos of Iraq, distinct to the Middle East, is the subversive capabilities of Iran. Iran has a unique method of warfare and entrenchment in fragmented societies in the Middle East. Indeed, there are no other countries— not regionally or globally— capable of cloning IRGC-like structures in other societies that then take over by force of arms. While these methods have received the most attention over the past four decades in Lebanon, Iran has made significant strides over the last five years in Iraq. Having reached the apex of its power in Lebanon, Iran's project in Iraq is not far behind.

Lastly, although ISIS was not the first insurgency the world has ever seen, a global terrorist organization with international appeal controlling large swaths of territory, and declaring a *state* from which to launch attacks around the world, is unprecedented. Iraq and Syria are unique in respect to terrorism in this case. However, Syria was examined pre-ISIS in this study, leaving only the case of Iraq to show what effects an ISIS-type organization has on the risk of human rights violations in the security sector. Terrorism and its effects on GHVRs in the security sector should be explored further, perhaps using qualitative indicators.

The efforts of Iran, along with the rise of ISIS, were significant factors in the breakdown of the Iraqi state. The resulting chaos, in what was essentially ungoverned territory, contributes to an environment in which GVHR are more likely to take place. Yet, the presence of the indicators examined in this study, cannot be considered with respect to the case of Iraq in 2014 without fully appreciating the monumental impact of these other elements unique to Iraq. To see the questionnaire filled out for Iraq, see Appendix IV.

⁵² Ibid.

The Way Ahead: Opportunities and Expansion

1) Add More Countries, Specifically Non-GVHR Countries

A natural first next step to additional work on this tool would be to expand the collection of data. As noted above in the challenges, the effectiveness of the evaluation of the indicators was limited by the relatively small sample size of countries examined. Expanding the number of countries would greatly increase the reliability of the resulting data. If enough clean countries could be found to equal the number of GVHR countries, the RISS calculation would be less skewed by outliers within the selected clean countries.

2) Further Explore and Integrate Qualitative, Unit Level, and Other Indicators

As was discovered during the initial literature review, it is difficult to distill every case of GHVRs down to ones and zeros. Many aspects of the causes and effects are nuanced and interrelated. Through the research for the case studies and compilation of indicators, several topics consistently arose that are believed to be a factor in the committal of GVHRs. However, whether due to insufficient information or the inability of this iteration of the tool to integrate qualitative variables, they are not currently used. Indicators listed below should be looked at in the future for potential correlation with countries that commit GVHRs.

Accountability

1. Do legal constraints against GVHRs committed by the security sector exist? Are there clearly visible loopholes?
2. Who has legal jurisdiction over alleged GVHRs committed by the security sector?
3. What is the GVHR reporting process?
4. Are alleged GHVRs regularly investigated and prosecuted, and do trials result in convictions?
5. Does independent, civilian budgetary oversight of the security sector exist?
6. What internal budgetary oversight mechanisms exist?
7. Is spousal rape illegal?

Unit-Level Indicators

1. Who has control of the unit, by law and in practice?
2. What is the age of unit at the first reported GVHR?
3. What is the size and demographics (minorities, females) of the unit?
4. Is it a police unit with military personnel assigned to it?
5. Is the unit geographically based/deployed near schools, water-points, markets, IDP/refugee camps, or other civilian centers, particularly those frequented by women and girls?
6. Training
 - a. What does the basic training for the unit entail? (How long, does it include human rights training)
 - b. How much and what kind of training does the unit engage in as a whole? (does it include human rights, crowd control, counter-terrorism training)
 - c. Is it a police unit that receives military-style training?
 - d. Is hazing reported in the unit?

The following is list of potential indicators that were neither confirmed nor denied within this prototype due to lack of reliable information across all 30 countries. More data are needed to determine whether the indicators are predictive in determining a country's risk of committing GVHRs.

Economic

1. Class inequality: the GINI index was used to measure the distribution of income across households, however the World Bank database has a large number of missing values.⁵³
2. Debt Service: The World Bank database has a large number of missing values.⁵⁴
3. Children in Employment: The World Bank database has a large number of missing values.⁵⁵

Social

1. Children in Forced Marriages: This report used UNICEF as it's source, but there are data missing for many countries.⁵⁶

Demographic

1. Number of Languages

Armed Forces

1. Reports of destruction of homes by security forces?
2. Civilian control of military?
3. Are the recruitment, hiring, assignment, and promotion policies of the security sector free from unlawful discrimination?

Conflict and Terrorism

1. Terrorism: This report made this a quantitative variable, using the number of deaths from terrorist bombings from a Center for Systemic Peace report.⁵⁷ However, this number may not fully convey the extent of the presence of terrorism within a country.
2. Reports of group support from foreign state?
3. U.S. military intervention within country

Human Rights

1. Internally displaced persons: This report used number from the UN Refugee Agency.⁵⁸ However, it is difficult to measure and there are no data for many countries. For the purposes of this research, it was not assumed that no data meant zero internally displaced persons. Because of this stance, there were not enough data to properly evaluate this indicator for placement in the tool.

⁵³ The World Bank, "GINI Index (World Bank Estimate) | Data," accessed November 28, 2017, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>.

⁵⁴ The World Bank, "Total Debt Service (% of Exports of Goods, Services and Primary Income) | Data," accessed November 28, 2017, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.TDS.DECT.EX.ZS>.

⁵⁵ The World Bank, "Children in Employment, Total (% of Children Ages 7-14) | Data," accessed November 28, 2017, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.0714.ZS>.

⁵⁶ UNICEF, *Reimagine the Future: Innovation for Every Child*, 2015.

⁵⁷ Monty G. Marshall, "High Casualty Terrorist Bombings," 2017.

⁵⁸ "UNHCR Statistics - The World in Numbers," UNHCR, accessed November 28, 2017, <http://popstats.unhcr.org>.

2. Does the country practice refoulement?
3. Number of political prisoners
4. Prison population as percent of total population

3) Build in Gradients to the Risk Points Awarded for Scaled Indicators

Currently the tool assigns risk points to a country based on whether it meets the criteria for the certain indicator, whether it is a yes or no or above or below a certain number. If the country meets the criteria, the points are assigned. The points are based on the strength of the indicator. However, this awards the points in an all or nothing scheme. For the strongest indicators, countries either receive 11 points or 0. As an example, imagine an indicator with a numerical scale from 0 to 100, where 0 indicates behavior strongly correlated with the committal of GVHRs. In the current tool, if the cutoff is less than 50, a country that scores 49 receives the same score as a country that scores a 0: the full 11 points. However, for a scaled indicator, the country that scores a 0 may be at a much higher risk for committing GVHRs than the country that scores a 49.

This can be improved upon in the future. Future iterations of the tool can incorporate gradients in the awarding of risk points. This is possible for indicators that are scaled (approximately 20 of the indicators currently used). Countries that are on the extreme ends of the scaled indicators can receive the full risk score that the indicator grants, and the points can be reduced from the end of the scale to the cutoff score proportionately. To use the example from above, the country that scores a 0 will receive the full 11 points, while the country that scores a 49 on the indicator will receive 1 or 2 points instead of the full amount.

4) Test Each Country with Values from 2016

A simple test of the prototype could be performed by evaluating each country for 2016, determining a risk score, and comparing that score to their actual GVHR performance in 2017.

5) Improve the Tool Using More Rigorous Statistical Methods

The tool was not created based on the rigorous statistical methods utilized in building other indices. The authors lacked both the capacity and the tools to do this analysis. One way to improve the tool would be a consistent and statistically sound method of imputing missing values, such as a Markov Chain Monte Carlo⁵⁹. This would give more robustness to the tool while also allowing for analysis of those indicators for which there was too little data to include them in the final tool, though they may have a significant relationship to the potential for GVHR.

The tool could also be improved by using a larger sample size, ideally to encompass the entire world. The current model uses fewer clean countries than non-GVHR countries. This is firstly because of the difficulty in finding countries clean of GVHRs, but also because the model and the calculation of the RISS rests on the assumption that in the total set of all world countries, there will be more GVHR countries than non-GVHR countries. So, though the set of 30 countries used in the model's development are thought to be at least partially representative, with greater capacity for data scrubbing and access to better sources, a larger sample size would help to make the tool more effective and allow the model to be further refined by the discovery of new indicators and exceptions.

⁵⁹ Clementine Burnley, Dirk Buda and Francois Kayitakire, "Quantitative Global Model for Armed Conflict Risk Assessment," 39.

Conclusion

The prototype in this report aims to incorporate former relevant research to demonstrate what could be possible for future research into this type of risk assessment. A methodological approach gathered possible explanatory factors of GVHRs, synthesized those factors, applied them to a representative sample of real-world examples, and used their applicability to create a workable prototype index. The research has demonstrated the potential for a tool in this area, both in assessing risk and identifying key areas for programming and resilience-building.

Any risk assessment index aims to incorporate an abundance of possible explanatory factors. Through this analysis, the team attempted to include as many explanatory factors as possible while also working to standardize the analysis of which factors are most predictive to create a working prototype. In looking at possible next steps, there are opportunities to include different types of indicators when the data is available. The prototype also leaves room for further expansion in statistical analysis, to better understand the correlation of these indicators to the risk of GVHR.

As data collection and research into GVHRs improves, the RAISHR leaves room for improvements to better fit the changing context of the world to which it applies. Though heterogeneous causal factors particular to a given case will always be present, a risk assessment index like the RAISHR has great potential to close existing knowledge gaps and influence policymaking decisions in the prevention of GVHRs.

Appendix I: Qualitative Description of Indicators

Positively correlated indicators are denoted with (+)

Negatively correlated indicators are denoted with (-)

Boolean indicators are denoted with (B)

I. **Risk Area 1: Capacity (32 points)**

Capacity identifies the means that security forces possess that allow them to commit GVHRs. This risk area includes driving factors that might explain the means behind the perpetration of GVHRs by security forces, or in some cases, the lack of means to meet international standards in the human rights arena that could act as a buffer for GVHRs.

Assumption: GVHRs are unlikely to be committed by security forces unless the security apparatus has the means and reach to perpetrate these violations. Capacity, or the means to commit a GVHR, is also considered as a lack of means for the security apparatus to operate within international standards. Some indicators indicate a positive correlation to violence. In this case, it could be assumed that unless the amount of resources is paired with positive factors, a greater capacity of security forces can result in a higher risk of perpetration of violations. Other indicators show a negative correlation, revealing that in certain cases, a lack of means correlates with higher risk. Here, a lack of resources is indicative of a security apparatus that does not have the means to conduct its objectives in compliance with international standards. This risk area leaves room for improvement with unit-specific subcategories.

Indicators:

1. Availability of resources (personnel, arms , ammunition, or other financial resources) for enforcement and repression (32 points)

- (-) *Military Expenditure per soldier (9 points)*

Military expenditure per soldier is defined in constant 2015 U.S. dollars. The value is determined by dividing expenditure values, as measured by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), by the total number of military personnel, as measured by the World Bank. Military expenditure in some form is used in two existing models of fragile states. It may be likely that when countries spend less money per soldier they are asking their military to do more with less. For example, spending less money on proper training. Lower spending is associated with an increased risk of GVHRs.

- (-) *Military expenditure per capita (8 points)*

Military expenditure per capita is defined in current U.S. dollars, with both the expenditure and population values as measured by SIPRI. GVHR risk increases in countries with low expenditure per capita.

- (+) *U.S. humanitarian aid to country (6 points)*

The amount of U.S. humanitarian aid given to a nation in U.S. dollars, as determined by the USAID. USAID defines humanitarian aid as funds for emergency response (material relief assistance and services, emergency food aid, relief coordination) and disaster prevention and preparedness. Foreign aid is a factor in the Fund for Peace Failed States Index, and this study uses the additional narrower category of U.S. humanitarian aid. With a stronger correlation than looking at military aid, countries that receive larger amounts of humanitarian aid are more likely

to commit GVHRs. This indicator is most likely a symptom of unstable countries, which are more likely to commit GVHRs.

- (+) *Amount of military U.S. foreign aid given to country (6 points)*

The amount of U.S. military aid given to a nation's military is measured in dollars and comes from USAID data. The USAID records total disbursements for a country in a year and provides the percentage of aid that goes to military purposes. The greater the aid given to a nation's military, the greater the risk of GVHRs occurring. There are two potential reasons this indicator is positively correlated with risk of GVHRs. First, military aid could be providing resources through which the security apparatus is able to commit GVHRs. Or, it is merely a symptom of an unstable state, as the previous indicator.

- (+) *Military expenditure in terms of GDP (3 points)*

This is a percentage of a nation's GDP that is spent on their military, with both the expenditure and GDP values measured by SIPRI. While not as strongly correlative as the other military expenditure indicators because very large and very small economies can be outliers, countries with a larger percentage are at higher risk most likely because they are spending less on interventions that mitigate the structural risk factors listed below, like health and infrastructure.

II. **Risk Area 2: Structural Factors (303 points)**

This risk area includes any characteristic or circumstance within a country whose presence or absence is correlated with future GVHRs.

Assumption: GVHRs are correlated with existing conditions within societies. A risk assessment should predict the relative risk profile of the presence or absence of certain factors.

Indicators:

1. **Level of Violence (34 points)**

- (+) *Score on Political Terror Scale (11 points)*

The score is the average of the Amnesty International and the Department of State scores on the Political Terror Scale, which captures levels of state-sanctioned or state-perpetrated violence. The scale is 1 to 5, with 5 representing the highest levels of violence. A higher score is correlated with an increased risk of GVHRs.

- (-) *Political Stability and Absence of Violence and Terrorism (10 points)*

One of the 6 World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, this captures the perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. It is measured on a percentile rank scale from 0 to 100 among all the countries in the world, where 0 corresponds to the lowest rank and 100 corresponds to the highest rank. Countries with lower ranks, indicating a low level of political stability, are correlated with higher instances of GVHRs.

- (-) *Peace years (10 points)*

Peace years is the number of years a country has been without conflict, as measured by the Center for Systemic Peace in their Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) dataset. The value is 0 in countries with current conflict; and consecutive years without international, civil, or ethnic violence or warfare are added to give the total number of peace years. This

indicator comes from the CIFP Failed and Fragile States model. A low number of years without conflict is indicative of a higher risk of GVHRs.

- (+) *Existing conflict (3 points)*

This indicator measures the magnitude of current conflict within a nation as determined by the Center for Systemic Peace in their MEPV dataset. The number is determined by summing six categories of international, civil, and ethnic violence and warfare that are each on a 0 to 10 scale, resulting in a number from 0 to 60, where 0 indicates no conflict. This indicator is used in both the CIFP Failed and Fragile States model and the State Fragility Index. Occurrence of conflict is associated with countries that commit GHVRs.

2. **Personal and Political Freedoms (24 points)**

- (-) *Right to life and security of person effectively guaranteed (7 points)*

This is a score from 0 to 1 which comes from World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index. The score measures the likelihood that police conduct torture, extrajudicial killings, or detentions and searches without warrants, and is determined with data collected through on-the-ground questionnaires. Lower scores, indicating a higher likelihood of police impropriety, are a strong indicator that police are actually committing GVHRs.

- (+) *Civil liberties (5 points)*

The civil liberties score comes from Freedom House's annual Freedom in the World Survey, that rates both civil liberties and political rights (see below). The ratings are on a scale from 1 to 7, 7 being the least free. The civil liberties score is based on fifteen indicators grouped into four categories: freedom of expression and belief, organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights. This indicator is used in the CIFP Failed and Fragile States model, the Fund for Peace Failed States Index, and the Index of State Weakness. Higher scores, indicating less civil liberties, are associated with countries that commit GVHRs.

- (-) *Press freedom (5 points)*

Press freedom is measured by Reporters Without Borders' Press Freedom Index where the lower the number, the more free the press is. Reporters Without Borders uses a questionnaire to determine the level freedom that the press enjoys and the extent to which authorities preserve those rights. This indicator is used in both the CIFP Failed and Fragile States model and the Fund for Peace Failed States Index. Lower press freedom scores are associated with GVHR committing countries.

- (B) *Reports of Political Prisoners (3 points)*

This is a Boolean variable taken from U.S. State Department Human Rights reports. It denotes if political prisoners were taken in the reporting year. The variable measures the respect for the Integrity of the person, including freedom from denial of fair public trial, and is associated with GVHR countries. In countries where reports of political prisoners exist, the risk of GVHRs is higher.

- (-) *Political rights (2 points)*

This score also comes from Freedom House's annual survey. The political rights score is based on ten indicators grouped into three categories: electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government. This indicator is used in the CIFP Failed and Fragile States model, the Fund for Peace Failed States Index, and the Index of State Weakness. High scores, indicating severely restricted political rights, are often associated with countries that commit GVHRs, but the correlation is weak.

- (-) *Level of competition for political office (2 points)*

This indicator comes from the Center for Systemic Peace's Polity IV Project. One of their concept variables used to measure authority characteristics is the Political Competition Concept, which measures the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena on a scale of 1 to 10. Low scores, where the political arena is stifled, often occur in countries that commit GVHRs.

3. **Economic Factors (105 points)**

- (+) *Foreign aid (dependency) (10 points)*

This value is taken from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, and provides the foreign aid received in current U.S. \$ in millions from all donors, which includes ODA, OOF, and Private flows for the year in question. Foreign aid dependency is used by multiple models assessing political risk and fragility. Here, high levels of dependency is indicative of a higher risk of GVHRs.

- (-) *Income bracket (8 points)*

The World Bank defines economies as Low-Income, Lower-Middle-Income, Upper-Middle-Income, and High-Income Economies. GVHRs are associated with countries with a GNI per capita of below \$12,236 (all except High-Income Economies).

- (-) *Government regulation of business (10 points)*

The Heritage Foundation scores 100 points to countries with the freest business environment. The score is based World Bank data on ten factors related to the time, cost, and procedures of Starting a business, Obtaining a license, and Closing a business. A score lower than 69 is associated with countries more likely to commit GVHRs.

- (+) *Remittances (8 points)*

Personal remittances, received is measured by the World Bank as the sum of personal transfers and compensation of employees, as a percentage of GDP. Data on personal remittances come from the IMF's Balance of Payment Statistics database with some missing data replaced by World Bank staff estimates. High levels of remittances used as a risk assessment, fragility, and early warning of state failure indicator by the Council on Foreign Relations.

- (+) *Infrastructure (8 points)*

Infrastructure is measured with the Public Services (P2) group of the Fragile States Index, and measures the adequacy and safety of roads, airports, railroads, and fuel supply. A level of over 3.5 indicates low level of infrastructure. The neglect of infrastructure negatively affects the country's potential development, and an index level of over 3.5 is associated with GVHR countries.

- (+) *U.S. non-military aid (8 points)*

The amount of U.S. aid given to a nation for economic purposes is measured in dollars and comes from USAID data. This number excludes military aid. Countries that receive larger amounts of aid are more likely to commit GVHRs. Foreign aid is a factor in the Fund for Peace Failed States Index, and this study further delineates aid from the U.S. out of aid from the rest of the world. A higher amount of aid is associated with countries that commit GVHRs. This is most likely a symptom of unstable countries.

- (+) *Resource rents (primary commodities) (3 points)*

Resource rents are defined as the price of extraction and production of a resource subtracted from the price at which a resource can be sold. Total natural resource rents in a country are measured as a percent of GDP as computed by the World Bank. Higher resource

rents, perhaps indicating government corruption in the natural resource sector, is indicative of higher risk of GVHRs.

a. Macroeconomic indicators (24 points)

- (-) *GDP per capita (10 points)*

Measured in current U.S. dollars by the World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. The indicator is used in several fragile states indices. Low GDP per capita are strongly associated with GVHR committing countries.

- (+) *Poverty rate (7 points)*

Poverty headcount ratio measured at \$1.90 a day by the World Bank in terms of percent of population. Data are based on primary household survey data obtained from government statistical agencies and World Bank country departments. Data for high-income economies are from the Luxembourg Income Study database. High rates of poverty are correlated with higher GVHR risk.

- (+) *Inflation rate (6 points)*

Annual percentage inflation, measured by the World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. High inflation is a sign of macroeconomic imbalances, and is associated with countries that commit GVHRs. It often reduces economic growth and future growth prospects, revealing unsustainable public finances.

- (+) *Unemployment (1 point)*

Percentage of total labor force by the World Bank modeled from International Labor Organization from the ILOSTAT database. Unemployment is included as an economic indicator of risk, fragility and early warning by the Council of Foreign Relations. High levels of unemployment are mildly associated with GVHR committing countries.

b. International trade (26 points)

- (-) *Openness to trade (9 points)*

Measured through an index created by the Heritage Foundation, using four pillars of economic freedom; Rule of Law, Government Size, Regulatory Efficiency and Open Markets. Low openness to trade scores are strongly associated with GVHR committing countries.

- (-) *Export of goods and services (4 points)*

Exports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP as measured by the World Bank. This indicator is used a Global terrorism indicator in a model cited by the Council on Foreign Relations. Lower levels of exports of goods and services is associated with GVHR countries.

- (+) *Trade diversity (3 points)*

Measured by the International Monetary Fund's Export Diversification Index. The database was developed by the IMF under an IMF-DFID research collaboration. Higher values indicate lower diversification and an increased risk for a country to commit GVHRs.

- (-) *Trade with neighboring countries (3 points)*

The percentage of GDP that is value of imports and exports with bordering countries (current U.S. \$) measured by the International Trade Center. Conflict indicator showing globalization, cooperation and reliance on neighboring countries. Low levels of trade with neighboring countries indicates less cooperation and an increased risk for a country to commit GVHRs.

- (-) *Current account balance (3 points)*

Current account balance is the sum of net trade in goods, services, and income plus net current transfers measured as a percentage of GDP by the World Bank using International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook and data files, and World Bank and OECD GDP estimates. Used in fragile state indices, a negative current account balance indicates an increased risk for a country to commit GVHRs.

- (B) *Oil exporter (2 points)*

A Boolean variable indicating whether or not a country exports crude oil. The data comes from the Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook. Oil exporting countries are correlated with higher GVHR risk.

- (-) *Manufacturing exports (2 points)*

Percentage of merchandise exports as measured by the World Bank. A lower percentage of manufacturing exports correlates to slightly higher risk of GVHR. The indicator was used as a global terrorism indicator for the Council of Foreign Relations.

4. **Environmental Factors (16 points)**

- (-) *Energy consumption per capita (8 points)*

Energy use based on kg of oil equivalent per capita as measures by the World Bank. This indicator has been used in several indices including ethnic war, civil war, peacebuilding capacity and fragile states. Low levels of energy consumption strongly associated with GVHR committing countries.

- (+) *Agricultural land (4 points)*

Percentage of land area dedicated for the use of the rearing of livestock and production of crops measured by the World Bank. This indicator has been used in both global terror and fragile state indices. Higher levels of agricultural land signal greater risk of committing GVHRs.

- (+) *Rate of deforestation (4 points)*

This indicator is measured by the percent of land area of a country that has lost over 50% of its tree cover. The data are measured by Global Forest Watch and this environmental indicator is used in a failed state index from the Council on Foreign Relations. High rate of deforestation is associated with increased risk a country will commit GVHRs.

5. **Societal Make-up and Population Statistics (42 points)**

- (B) *Youth bulge (8 points)*

A youth bulge exists if more than 20% of the total population is between the ages 15-24, from UN population data. This phenomenon is particularly relevant to developing countries in which much of the population is very young, and has been identified in several conflict studies as a correlate of risk of conflict. There is a strong correlation between youth bulge and GVHR committing countries.

- (+) *Population in agriculture (8 points)*

Population in agriculture refers to the % of the total population who draws their livelihood from an agricultural setting. Used in both the Marshall Global Terrorism report and the Fund for Peace Fragile States Index, a higher population in agriculture is thought to correlate with instability and vulnerability to shocks, and is associated with countries that commit GVHRs.

- (-) *Urban Population (8 points)*

Urban population is calculated as the percentage of a country's total population living in urban areas. This indicator is used in both the CIFP Failed and Fragile States Index and the Nathan Associates Fragile States Indicators. Countries with relatively more dispersed and therefore less urban populations are thought to be more prone to conflict due to administrative, logistical, and governance challenges.

- (+) *Urbanization growth rate (6 points)*

Urbanization growth rate is measured as the annual percentage increase in urban population growth. Higher growth rates are correlated with higher incidence of GVHRs, presumably through their impact on stability and security. It has been used as an indicator of fragility in the CIFP Failed and Fragile States indicators.

- (B) *Persecution of indigenous peoples (5 points)*

Reports of persecution of ethnic groups who are the original inhabitants of a given region reported by UNHCR and Minority Rights Group International. This indicator has been used in several indices including ethnic war, civil war, peacebuilding capacity and fragile states. If reports of persecution of indigenous people are present there is an increased risk of GVHRs.

- (-) *Population density (3 points)*

Population density is measured as the number of people per square kilometer. An extension of the urban population indicator's logic, less dense populations are more likely to commit GVHRs. This has been used as a failed and fragile state indicator, as disperse populations pose governance challenges to government and security forces.

- *Ethnic diversity (2 points)*

Defined as "yes" if 20 percent or more of a country's population consists of minority ethnic groups. Found in indices of armed conflict and the instability and fragility of states. If a country has ethnic diversity, it is slightly associated with GVHR committing countries.

- (B) *Is there a religious majority? (1 point)*

Defined as yes if a country has a religious majority according to the CIA World Factbook. This Boolean indicator is a weaker predictor of GVHR, but helps to understand factors within a society that could lead to conditions conducive to GVHR.

- (+) *Population growth rate (1 point)*

Population growth rate extends the logic of urbanization growth rate. It is measured as an annual percentage. It has also been used as a failed state indicator; in the GVHR context, higher growth rates are correlated with higher risk of GVHR.

6. **Health Factors (58 points)**

- (-) *Health expenditure per capita (9 points)*

This is measured in current U.S. dollars. A proxy for government accountability and institutional strength, among other ideas, it is used in several fragile states indices. Lower health expenditures correlate with higher GVHR risk.

- (-) *Food security (9 points)*

Food security is measured using the Global Food Security Index, which gives overall food security as a score between 25 and 85.6, a composite of the categories affordability, availability, and quality and safety. Countries with lower food security scores have higher incidence of GVHRs. This indicator was drawn from the CIFP failed and fragile states index.

- (-) *Access to water (9 points)*

Another institutional strength and stability measure, access to water is measured as a percentage of the population to water. Much research exists dealing with water as a driver of conflict; in this context, a lower value for population access to water is correlated with higher GVHR risk.

- (-) *Access to sanitation (8 points)*

This is defined as the percentage of the population with access to improved sanitation facilities, which are a correlate of health status. Much like access to water, decreased levels of sanitation access are a predictor of GVHR risk.

- (-) *Life expectancy (8 points)*

Life expectancy is given in years for a given country in a given year. Another health marker, life expectancy can signal a variety of issues relating to government provision of services, availability of those services, and opportunity and human development. Lower life expectancies are correlated with higher incidence of GVHR.

- (+) *Infant/child mortality (7 points)*

Infant/child mortality is an important health metric because it signals the health prospects in the fragile first months of life, an indicator that has been used across various PITF and fragility studies. It is measured as a rate per 1000 live births. Higher mortality rates are correlated with a higher risk for GVHRs.

- (+) *Maternal mortality (4 points)*

Maternal mortality, a historically strong indicator of health status, is measured as a modeled estimate per 100,000 live births. It is used in both the CIFP Failed and Fragile States indicators and the Fund for Peace Failed States Index, amongst other studies. Higher mortality rates are correlated with a higher risk for GVHRs.

- (-) *Caloric intake/undernourishment (4 points)*

Differing from food security in that it measures only Kcal per capita per day and not an overall affordability, availability, and quality and safety ranking, this indicator is negatively correlated with GVHR risk.

7. Respect for Rights and Freedoms of Women and Children (24 points)

- (-) *Literacy rates (11 points)*

One of the strongest indicators, literacy rates are measured as the adult total percentage of the population ages 15 and above. A measure of human development, it was applied in the CIFP Global Index as a conflict indicator. A low literacy rate is strongly correlated with a higher risk of GHVR.

- (B) *Is Abortion Prohibited Altogether or Permitted Only to Save the Woman's Life (7 points)*

Given the paucity of information and reports on prevalence of rape, this indicator is an insight into government attitudes toward bodily autonomy and women's rights. This indicator is coded as Boolean, taking the value 1 if abortion is permitted only to save a woman's life or prohibited altogether. This is a strong correlate in that none of the non-GVHR countries examined in this study take the value 1.

- (-) *Gender Parity Index in primary level enrollment (6 points)*

This indicator measures school enrollment, gross, at primary and secondary levels, giving a gender parity index (GPI) which is given as 1 where enrollment of boys and girls is the same

and greater than 1 where enrollment of girls is greater than enrollment of boys. $GPI < 1$ correlates with higher risk of GVHR.

III. **Risk Area 3: Triggering Factors (19 points)**

This risk area includes the any circumstance or event that could amplify existing conditions to bring about the perpetration of GVHRs.

Assumption: A risk assessment should identify triggers in the form of policy changes or events that act as a spark to increase the probability that states will imminently commit GVHRs under these short-term circumstances.

Indicators:

1. **Declaration of state of emergency or special security measures that restrict the rights of citizens and lead to pushback by citizens against government policy (6 points)**

- *(B) Is there a declared state of emergency? (3 points)*

This is a Boolean indicator that takes the value 1 if in a given year a country has declared a state of emergency. Though not a risk in and of itself, a state of emergency and the associated suspension of some rights, if not respected, can act as a flashpoint to create an environment in which GVHRs occur.

- *(+) Reports of current Anti-government demonstrations? (3 points)*

Reports of current anti-government demonstrations signal the current culture of unrest that could trigger GVHRs. A Boolean indicator, those countries in which reports exist have a higher risk of GVHRs. This indicator has been used in measuring state fragility.

2. **Spillover effects of instability, tensions from conflicts in neighboring countries (13 points)**

- *(+) Refugees Produced as % of Pop (8 points)*

This indicator is taken from UNHCR and divided by the total population for the Country of Origin. A high number of refugees from a country indicates political instability and conflict and a value of over 0.01% is associated with countries that commit GVHR.

- *(+) Refugees Hosted as % of Pop (5 points)*

This indicator is taken from UNHCR and divided by the total population for the Country of Asylum. A high number of refugees in the host country causes economic strain and social tensions, and is associated with countries that commit GVHRs.

IV. **Risk Area 4: Record of Past GVHRs (42 points)**

This risk area includes past history of GVHRs and therefore represent a risk of future violations.

Assumption: A country that has a history of GVHRs or where GVHRs are occurring is more likely to commit GVHRs, especially where past GVHRs have not been fairly addressed through accountability, transitional justice, or other mechanisms.

Indicators:

1. Past or present commission of GVHRs, which include extrajudicial killings, torture, enforced disappearances, and rape (25 points)

- *(B) Reports of extrajudicial killings? (9 points)*

This is a Boolean variable taken from U.S. State Department Human Rights reports. It denotes that extrajudicial killings have happened in the reporting year, and is one of the conditions of Gross Violations of Human Rights. A yes answer is strongly correlated with a higher risk of GVHRs.

- *(B) Reports of torture? (7 points)*

This is a Boolean variable taken from US State Department Human Rights reports. It denotes that there has been torture by armed forces in the reporting year, and is one of the conditions of Gross Violations of Human Rights. A yes answer is strongly correlated with a higher risk of GVHRs.

- *(B) Reports of enforced disappearances? (6 points)*

This is a Boolean variable taken from U.S. State Department Human Rights reports. It denotes that enforced disappearances have taken place in the reporting year, and is one of the conditions of Gross Violations of Human Rights. A yes answer is strongly correlated with a higher risk of GVHRs.

- *(B) Reports of rape? (3 points)*

This is a Boolean variable taken from U.S. State Department Human Rights reports. It denotes that rape by armed forces have occurred in the reporting year, and is one of the conditions of Gross Violations of Human Rights. A yes answer is mildly correlated with a higher risk of GVHRs.

2. Lack of mass pushback in the face of ongoing or predicted GVHRs. Absence of transitional justice or lack of initiatives for inclusivity and reconciliation following a conflict (6 points)

- *(-) People do not resort to violence to redress personal grievances (6 points)*

This is a score from 0 to 1 which comes from World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index. The score measures the likelihood that citizens will use violence to settle disputes between themselves or with criminals, without going through proper judicial or police channels. A lower score, indicating that citizens often resort to violence, is a risk factor attributed to countries that commit GVHRs.

3. Impunity for evident GVHRs (11 points)

- *(-) Rule of Law (11 points)*

One of the 6 World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, it captures the perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. It is measured on a percentile rank scale from 0 to 100 among all the countries in the world, where 0 corresponds to the lowest rank and 100 corresponds to the highest rank. A lower rank is associated with countries that commit GVHRs.

V. **Risk Area 5: Weakness of State Institutions (60 points)**

This risk area includes common institutional factors that could affect the capacity of a country to prevent GVHRs by security forces, in addition to factors that identify the characteristics of governments that create environments conducive to GVHRs.

Assumption: When a country lacks appropriate Institutions that are governed by the rule of law and good governance practices, its capacity to prevent the occurrence of GVHRs significantly decreases. Consequently, security forces could take advantage of this weakness to commit abuses on vulnerable populations.

Indicators:

1. Absence of legal framework that prevents GVHRs through the ratification of international human rights treaties (5 points)

- *(B) Combination: Did country sign AND NOT ratify ICPPED (4 points)*

This is a Boolean variable that indicates whether a country signed the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. A high number of countries that have committed GVHRs have signed the convention but not ratified, indicating absence of country legislation to give domestic effect to the convention.

- *(B) Combination: Did country sign AND NOT ratify Convention against Torture? (1 point)*

This is a Boolean variable that indicates whether a country signed the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. A high number of countries that have committed GVHRs have signed the convention but not ratified, indicating absence of country legislation to give domestic effect to the convention.

2. Corruption and governance (55 points)

- *(-) Regulatory Quality (11 points)*

One of the 6 World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators that captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. It is measured on a percentile rank scale from 0 to 100 among all the countries in the world, where 0 corresponds to the lowest rank and 100 corresponds to the highest rank. A lower rank is associated with countries that commit GVHRs.

- *(-) Control of Corruption (11 points)*

One of the 6 World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, it captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. It is measured on a percentile rank scale from 0 to 100 among all the countries in the world, where 0 corresponds to the lowest rank and 100 corresponds to the highest rank. A lower rank is associated with countries that commit GVHRs.

- *(-) Government Effectiveness (10 points)*

One of the 6 World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, this captures the perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. It is measured on a percentile rank scale from 0 to 100 among all the countries in the world, where 0 corresponds to the lowest

rank and 100 corresponds to the highest rank. A lower rank is associated with countries that commit GVHRs.

- (-) *Voice and Accountability (6 points)*

One of the 6 World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, it captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. It is measured on a percentile rank scale from 0 to 100 among all the countries in the world, where 0 corresponds to the lowest rank and 100 corresponds to the highest rank. A lower rank is associated with countries that commit GVHRs.

- (-) *Regime Durability (6 points)*

This value is taken from the Center for Systemic Peace's Polity IV Project, and is measured by the number of years since the most recent regime change. The first year of the new regime is the year zero, and each without a regime change increases the score by one. Countries with a more durable regime, higher than 28, are less likely associated with GVHRs.

- (B) *Ungoverned spaces (5 points)*

This Boolean value was taken from desk research for each individual country in question to decide whether there are ungoverned spaces in the country in the reporting year. Areas that are ungoverned by the authority indicates a lack of control and weak institutions. Countries that have ungoverned spaces are more likely to commit GVHRs.

- (-) *Level of Democracy (3 points)*

This value is taken from the Center for Systemic Peace's Polity IV Project, and is measures mainly the openness, competitiveness, as well as the constraints on executive positions. This measure of institutional democracy is higher for countries less likely to commit GVHR.

- (-) *Government share of GDP (2 points)*

This value taken from the World Bank is the final government consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP. It includes all government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services, but excludes military expenditures that are part of government capital formation. Countries with GVHRs are associated with lower values.

- (B) *Prior democracy (1 point)*

This indicates if a country is not an electoral democracy in the reporting year but was at one at time after 1988, indicating a reversal of progress towards democratic freedoms and liberties. It is represented by a Boolean value, taken from the Freedom House electoral democracy database. Countries with GVHRs are weakly correlated with this phenomenon.

TOTAL POINTS: 456

Appendix II: Questionnaire Indicator Instructions

| Indicator number | Indicator instructions |
|------------------|--|
| 1 | Calculate military expenditure from SIPRI divided by the total military personnel from the World Bank |
| 2 | SIPRI data: Military expenditure per capita by country |
| 3 | USAID dashboard: U.S. Humanitarian Aid disbursements |
| 4 | USAID dashboard: U.S. Military Aid disbursements |
| 5 | SIPRI data: Military expenditure by country as percentage of gross domestic product |
| 6 | Average score of the Political Terror Scale by country for Amnesty International (PTS_A) and Political Terror Scale by country for the U.S. State Department (PTS_S) |
| 7 | World Bank Governance Indicator: use the rank for Political Stability and Absence of Violence and Terrorism |
| 8 | Calculate the number of years since last regime change using the durability variable in Polity IV database |
| 9 | Calculate the sum of magnitudes for all societal and interstate conflicts (ACTOTAL) in the Major Episodes of Political Violence database |
| 10 | World Justice Project, Rule of Law dashboard: use indicator 4.2 (the right to life and security of the person is effectively guaranteed) under Fundamental Rights |
| 11 | Freedom House Country and Territory Ratings Database: use the CL (civil liberties) variable |
| 12 | Reporters without Borders: use the Press Freedom Index |
| 13 | Desk research to decide if there have been reports of political prisoners |
| 14 | Freedom House Country and Territory Ratings Database: use the PR (political rights) variable |
| 15 | Polity IV database: use POLCOMP variable |
| 16 | OECD database: select all donors, select country in question as recipient, select all flows, all sectors, and year in question |
| 17 | Heritage Foundation: use the Business Freedom index |
| 18 | World Bank Income Classification |
| 19 | World Bank Development Indicators: use value for personal remittances, received (% of GDP) |
| 20 | Fund for Peace: use variable P2 (Public Services) under Fragile State Index |
| 21 | USAID dashboard: U.S. non-Military Aid disbursements |
| 22 | World Bank Development Indicators: use value for total natural resources rents (% of GDP) |
| 23 | World Bank Development Indicators: use value for GDP per capita (current U.S. \$) |
| 24 | World Bank Development Indicators: use value for poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population) |
| 25 | World Bank Development Indicators: use value for inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) |
| 26 | World Bank Development Indicators: use value for unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate) |

| | |
|----|---|
| 27 | Heritage Foundation: use the Trade Freedom Index |
| 28 | World Bank Development Indicators: use value for exports of goods and services (% of GDP) |
| 29 | International Monetary Fund: use Export Diversification Index |
| 30 | International Trade Statistics: use Trade Map to obtain the % of GDP that is value of imports and exports with bordering countries in current U.S. \$ |
| 31 | World Bank Development Indicators: use value for current account balance (% of GDP) |
| 32 | Desk research to decide if the country is an oil exporter |
| 33 | World Bank Development Indicators: use value for manufactures exports (% of merchandise exports) |
| 34 | World Bank Development Indicators: use value for energy use (kg of oil equivalent per capita) |
| 35 | World Bank Development Indicators: use value for agricultural land (% of land area) |
| 36 | Global Forest Watch: use the percentage of Land Area that has lost over 50% of tree canopy (base year: 2000) |
| 37 | Use UN Data to get % of population aged between 15-24 is over 20% of the total to determine if there is Youth Bulge |
| 38 | World Bank Development Indicators: use value for employment in agriculture (% of total employment) |
| 39 | World Bank Development Indicators: use value for urban population (% of total) |
| 40 | World Bank Development Indicators: use value for urban population growth (annual %) |
| 41 | Desk research on OHCHR and Minority Rights Group International to determine if there is persecution of indigenous people in the reporting year |
| 42 | World Bank Development Indicators: use value for population density (people per sq. km of land area) |
| 43 | Desk research to decide if 20% or more of the total population is from minority ethnic groups |
| 44 | Desk research to decide if there is a religious majority (over %50) |
| 45 | World Bank Development Indicators: use value for population growth (annual %) |
| 46 | World Bank Development Indicators: use value for health expenditure per capita (current U.S. \$) |
| 47 | Economist Intelligence Unit: use the overall score from the Global Food Security Index |
| 48 | World Bank Development Indicators: use value for improved water source (% of population with access) |
| 49 | World Bank Development Indicators: use value for improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access) |
| 50 | World Bank Development Indicators: use value for life expectancy at birth, total (years) |
| 51 | World Bank Development Indicators: use value for mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) |
| 52 | World Bank Development Indicators: use value for maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births) |

| | |
|----|--|
| 53 | Our World in Data: use Kcal per capita per day |
| 54 | World Bank Development Indicators: use value for literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above) |
| 55 | Desk research, using the Center for Reproductive Rights, to determine if abortion is prohibited or only permitted to save a life |
| 56 | World Bank Development Indicators: use value for School enrollment, primary and secondary (gross), gender parity index (GPI) |
| 57 | Desk research to determine if the country has declared a state of emergency in the reporting year |
| 58 | Desk research to determine if there are ongoing anti-government demonstrations |
| 59 | UNHCR dashboard: sum refugees in all countries from focus country and divide by total population |
| 60 | UNHCR dashboard: sum refugees in all refugee populations in the focus country and divide by total population |
| 61 | Desk research using State Department Human Rights Reports to determine if there have been reports of extrajudicial killings by armed forces |
| 62 | Desk research using State Department Human Rights Reports to determine if there have been reports of torture by armed forces |
| 63 | Desk research using State Department Human Rights Reports to determine if there have been reports of forced disappearances by armed forces |
| 64 | Desk research using State Department Human Rights Reports to determine if there have been reports of rape by armed forces |
| 65 | World Justice Project, Rule of Law dashboard: use indicator 5.3 (People do not resort to violence to redress personal grievances) under Order and Security |
| 66 | World Bank Governance Indicator: use the rank for Rule of Law |
| 67 | OHCHR: use Status of Ratification dashboard |
| 68 | OHCHR: use Status of Ratification dashboard |
| 69 | World Bank Governance Indicator: use rank for Regulatory Quality |
| 70 | World Bank Governance Indicator: use rank for Control of Corruption |
| 71 | World Bank Governance Indicator: use rank for Government Effectiveness |
| 72 | World Bank Governance Indicator: use rank for Voice and Accountability |
| 73 | For the number of years since last armed conflict within borders, using the Major Episodes of Political Violence database, count number of years with ACTOTAL is 0 |
| 74 | Desk research to determine if there are ungoverned spaces |
| 75 | Polity IV database: use DEMOC variable |
| 76 | World Bank Development Indicators: use value for general government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) |
| 77 | Freedom House Electoral Democracies database: if the country is not currently a democracy, scroll back to see if it was ever a democracy between 1988 and 2016 |

Appendix III: Prototype Questionnaire Example - Brazil

Risk Assessment Index

Input information for each indicator in the data column. CRS column shows indicator risk.

COUNTRY: Brazil

| | <u>Data</u> | <u>CRS</u> |
|---|--|----------------|
| Risk Area 1: Capacity | | |
| Availability of resources (personnel, arms, ammunition, or other financial resources) for enforcement and repression | | |
| Military Expenditure per Soldier according to SIPRI (constant 2015 USD divided by | | |
| 1 | population) | 34630.3 0 |
| 2 | Military Expenditure per Capita according to SIPRI (current USD) | 160.9 8 |
| 3 | U.S. Humanitarian Aid Disbursements to Country according to USAID (USD) | 0 0 |
| 4 | Military Aid Disbursements to Country by U.S. according to USAID (USD) | 1336766 6 |
| 5 | Military Expenditure as Percentage of GDP according to SIPRI | 1.5 % 0 |
| Area Subtotal | | 14 /32 |
| Risk Area 2: Structural Factors | | |
| Level of Violence | | |
| Political Terror Scale Average Score according to Amnesty International and DoS scores | | |
| 6 | (1-5) | 4 11 |
| 7 | Percentile Rank of Worldwide Governance Indicator: Political Stability and Absence of Violence and Terrorism | 37 10 |
| 8 | Number of Consecutive Years without Internal Conflict according to Center for Systemic Peace | 33 10 |
| 9 | Combined Magnitude of Existing Internal Conflict according to Center for Systemic Peace | 0 0 |
| Subtotal | | 31 |
| Personal and Political Freedoms | | |
| Score for World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index's sub-factor: Right to Life and Security of Person Effectively Guaranteed | | |
| 10 | | 0.66 7 |
| 11 | Civil Liberties Score according to Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report | 2 0 |
| 12 | Press Freedom Index according to Reporters Without Borders | 32.75 0 |
| 13 | Are there Reports of Political Prisoners in the DoS Country Report on Human Rights Practices? | No 0 |
| 14 | Political Rights Score according to Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report | 2 0 |
| 15 | Level of Competition for Political Office with data from the Center for Systemic Peace's Polity IV project | 9 0 |
| Subtotal | | 7 |
| Economic Factors | | |
| 16 | Foreign Aid to Country according to OECD (in millions of current USD) | 1155.7 10 |
| 17 | Business Freedom Score according to Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom | 53 10 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---------|---|----|------|
| 18 | Income Bracket according to World Bank (Low, Low Middle, Upper Middle, High) | UM | | 8 | |
| 19 | Personal Remittances as Percentage of GDP according to World Bank | 0.1 | % | 0 | |
| 20 | Public Services Score according to Fund for Peace's Fragile States Index | 5.4 | | 8 | |
| 21 | U.S. Economic Aid Disbursements (non-military) to Country according to USAID (USD) | 3.3E+07 | | 8 | |
| 22 | Resource Rents (primary commodities) as Percentage of GDP according to World Bank | 4.5 | % | 3 | |
| Macroeconomic indicators | | | | | |
| 23 | GDP per Capita according to the World Bank (current USD) | 12216.9 | | 0 | |
| 24 | Poverty Rate as Percentage of Population according to World Bank | 4.9 | % | 7 | |
| 25 | Inflation Rate as Annual Percentage according to World Bank | 7.5 | % | 6 | |
| 26 | Unemployment as Percentage of Population according to World Bank | 7.1 | % | 1 | |
| | Subtotal | | | 14 | /24 |
| International trade | | | | | |
| 27 | Trade Freedom Score according to Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom | 69.7 | | 9 | |
| 28 | Exports of Goods and Services as Percentage of GDP according to World Bank | 11.63 | % | 4 | |
| 29 | Export Diversification Index according to IMF | 2.45 | | 0 | |
| 30 | Combined Value of Imports and Exports with Bordering Countries as Percentage of GDP according to International Trade Centre | 2.57 | % | 3 | |
| 31 | Current Account Balance as Percentage of GDP according to World Bank | -4.2 | % | 3 | |
| 32 | Is the Country an Oil Exporter? | Yes | | 2 | |
| 33 | Manufacturing Exports as Percentage of Merchandise Exports according to World Bank | 36.4 | % | 2 | |
| | Subtotal | | | 23 | /26 |
| | Economic Subtotal | | | 84 | /105 |
| Environmental Factors | | | | | |
| 34 | Kilogram of Oil Consumption per Capita according to World Bank | 1451 | | 0 | |
| 35 | Percentage of Land Area in Agricultural Use according to World Bank | 33.4 | % | 4 | |
| 36 | Percentage of Land Area with > 50% Loss of Canopy according to Global Forest Watch | 0.204 | % | 4 | |
| | Subtotal | | | 8 | /16 |
| Societal Make-up and Population Statistics | | | | | |
| 37 | Is the Youth Population (Ages 15-24) over 20% of Total Population? (Youth Bulge) | Yes | | 8 | |
| 38 | Agricultural Workforce as Percentage of Total Employed Population according to World Bank | 14.47 | % | 0 | |
| 39 | Urban Population as Percentage of Total according to World Bank | 85 | % | 0 | |
| 40 | Urbanization Growth Rate as Annual Percentage according to World Bank | 1.235 | % | 0 | |
| 41 | Is there Persecution of Indigenous Peoples as Reported by UNHCR or Minority Rights Group? | Yes | | 5 | |
| 42 | Population Density (people/sq. km of land area) according to World Bank | 24.2 | | 3 | |
| 43 | Is 20% of the Population or More Minority Ethnic Groups? | Yes | | 2 | |
| 44 | Is there a Religious Majority? | Yes | | 1 | |
| 45 | Population Growth Rate as Annual Percentage according to World Bank | 0.917 | % | 0 | |
| | Subtotal | | | 19 | /42 |
| Health Factors | | | | | |

| | | | | |
|--|---|--------|------------|-------------|
| 46 | Health Expenditure per Capita according to World Bank (current USD) | 993.5 | 0 | |
| 47 | Food Security Score according to Global Food Security Index | 66.5 | 0 | |
| 48 | Percentage of Population with Access to Water according to World Bank | 98 % | 0 | |
| 49 | Percentage of Population with Access to Sanitation according to World Bank | 82.7 % | 8 | |
| 50 | Life Expectancy according to World Bank | 74.7 | 8 | |
| 51 | Infant Mortality per 1,000 Child Births according to World Bank | 14.3 | 7 | |
| 52 | Maternal Mortality per 100,000 Child Births according to World Bank | 48 | 0 | |
| 53 | Kilocalories per Capita per Day according to Our World in Data | 3263 | 0 | |
| | Subtotal | | 23 | /58 |
| Respect for Rights and Freedoms of Women and Children | | | | |
| 54 | Literacy Rate (Percentage of Total Population above 15) according to World Bank | 91.5 % | 11 | |
| 55 | Is Abortion Prohibited Altogether or Permitted Only to Save Woman's Life? | Yes | 7 | |
| 56 | Ratio of Girls to Boys Enrolled at Primary and Secondary Levels at Public and Private Schools according to World Bank | 1.03 | 0 | |
| | Subtotal | | 18 | /24 |
| | Area Subtotal | | 190 | /303 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|----------|-----------|------------|
| Risk Area 3: Triggering Factors | | | | |
| Declaration of state of emergency or special security measures that restrict the citizens' rights and pushback by citizens against government policy | | | | |
| 57 | Is there a declared state of emergency? | Yes | 3 | |
| 58 | Are there Reports of Current Anti-Government Demonstrations? | Yes | 3 | |
| | Subtotal | | 6 | /6 |
| Spillover effects of instability, tensions from conflicts in neighboring countries | | | | |
| 59 | Refugees Produced as Percent of Population according to UNHCR | 0.0011 % | 0 | |
| 60 | Refugees Hosted as Percent of Population according to UNHCR | 0.024 % | 5 | |
| | Subtotal | | 5 | /13 |
| | Area Subtotal | | 11 | /19 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|-----|----|-----|
| Risk Area 4: Record of Past GVHRs | | | | |
| Past or present commission of GVHRs, which include extrajudicial killings, torture, enforced disappearances, and rape | | | | |
| 61 | Are there Reports of Extrajudicial Killings? | Yes | 9 | |
| 61 | Are there Reports of Torture? | Yes | 7 | |
| 63 | Are there Reports of Enforced Disappearances? | No | 0 | |
| 64 | Are there Reports of Rape? | No | 0 | |
| | Subtotal | | 16 | /25 |
| Lack of mass pushback in the face of ongoing GVHRs, absence of transitional justice or lack of initiatives for inclusivity and reconciliation following a conflict | | | | |

| | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|------|-----------|------------|
| 65 | Score for World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index's sub-factor: People Do Not Resort to Violence to Redress Personal Grievances | 0.46 | 6 | |
| | Subtotal | | 6 | /6 |
| Impunity for evident GVHRs | | | | |
| 66 | Percentile Rank of Worldwide Governance Indicator: Rule of Law | 53 | 11 | |
| | Subtotal | | 11 | /11 |
| | Area Subtotal | | 33 | /42 |

| Risk Area 5: Weakness of State Institutions | | | | |
|---|--|--------|-----------|------------|
| Absence of legal framework that prevents GVHRs through the ratification of international human rights treaties | | | | |
| 67 | Did the Country Sign AND NOT Ratify ICPPED? | No | 0 | |
| 68 | Did the Country Sign AND NOT Ratify Convention Against Torture? | No | 0 | |
| | Subtotal | | 0 | /5 |
| Corruption and governance | | | | |
| 69 | Percentile Rank of Worldwide Governance Indicator: Regulatory Quality | 55 | 11 | |
| 70 | Percentile Rank of Worldwide Governance Indicator: Control of Corruption | 56 | 11 | |
| 71 | Percentile Rank of Worldwide Governance Indicator: Government Effectiveness | 51 | 10 | |
| 72 | Percentile Rank of Worldwide Governance Indicator: Voice and Accountability | 61 | 6 | |
| 73 | Number of Years since Most Recent Major Regime Change according to Center for Systemic Peace | 28 | 0 | |
| 74 | Are there Ungoverned Spaces within the Country? | Yes | 5 | |
| 75 | Level of Democracy Score according to Center for Systemic Peace | 8 | 0 | |
| 76 | Government Expenditure as Percentage of GDP according to World Bank | 18.9 % | 0 | |
| 77 | Is the Country not an Electoral Democracy now, but was at one Time Prior? | | 0 | |
| | Subtotal | | 43 | /55 |
| | Area Subtotal | | 43 | /60 |

Country Risk Score Profile

291

High

Appendix IV: Prototype Questionnaire Example - Iraq

Risk Assessment Index

Input information for each indicator in the data column. CRS column shows indicator risk.

COUNTRY: Iraq

| | <u>Data</u> | <u>CRS</u> |
|---|---|----------------|
| Risk Area 1: Capacity | | |
| Availability of resources (personnel, arms, ammunition, or other financial resources) for enforcement and repression | | |
| 1 | Military Expenditure per Soldier according to SIPRI (constant 2015 USD divided by population) | 45360.4 0 |
| 2 | Military Expenditure per Capita according to SIPRI (current USD) | 228.1 8 |
| 3 | U.S. Humanitarian Aid Disbursements to Country according to USAID (USD) | 7.4E+07 6 |
| 4 | Military Aid Disbursements to Country by U.S. according to USAID (USD) | 1.9E+08 6 |
| 5 | Military Expenditure as Percentage of GDP according to SIPRI | 3.9 % 3 |
| Area Subtotal | | 23 /32 |

| | | |
|--|---|----------------|
| Risk Area 2: Structural Factors | | |
| Level of Violence | | |
| 6 | Political Terror Scale Average Score according to Amnesty International and DoS scores (1-5) | 0 |
| 7 | Percentile Rank of Worldwide Governance Indicator: Political Stability and Absence of Violence and Terrorism | 4 10 |
| 8 | Number of Consecutive Years without Internal Conflict according to Center for Systemic Peace | 0 10 |
| 9 | Combined Magnitude of Existing Internal Conflict according to Center for Systemic Peace | 5 3 |
| Subtotal | | 23 /34 |
| Personal and Political Freedoms | | |
| # | Score for World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index's sub-factor: Right to Life and Security of Person Effectively Guaranteed | 0 |
| # | Civil Liberties Score according to Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report | 6 5 |
| # | Press Freedom Index according to Reporters Without Borders | 44.67 5 |
| # | Are there Reports of Political Prisoners in the DoS Country Report on Human Rights Practices? | Yes 3 |
| # | Political Rights Score according to Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report | 6 2 |
| # | Level of Competition for Political Office with data from the Center for Systemic Peace's Polity IV project | 6 2 |
| Subtotal | | 17 /24 |
| Economic Factors | | |
| # | Foreign Aid to Country according to OECD (in millions of current USD) | 1541.5 10 |
| # | Business Freedom Score according to Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom | 47 10 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---------|---|----|------|
| # | Income Bracket according to World Bank (Low, Low Middle, Upper Middle, High) | UM | | 8 | |
| # | Personal Remittances as Percentage of GDP according to World Bank | 0.3 | % | 0 | |
| # | Public Services Score according to Fund for Peace's Fragile States Index | 7.6 | | 8 | |
| # | U.S. Economic Aid Disbursements (non-military) to Country according to USAID (USD) | 9.9E+08 | | 8 | |
| # | Resource Rents (primary commodities) as Percentage of GDP according to World Bank | 42.5 | % | 3 | |
| Macroeconomic indicators | | | | | |
| # | GDP per Capita according to the World Bank (current USD) | 6925.2 | | 10 | |
| # | Poverty Rate as Percentage of Population according to World Bank | 2.5 | % | 7 | |
| # | Inflation Rate as Annual Percentage according to World Bank | 0.984 | % | 0 | |
| # | Unemployment as Percentage of Population according to World Bank | 15.1 | % | 1 | |
| | Subtotal | | | 18 | /24 |
| International trade | | | | | |
| # | Trade Freedom Score according to Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom | | | 0 | |
| # | Exports of Goods and Services as Percentage of GDP according to World Bank | 39.7 | % | 4 | |
| # | Export Diversification Index according to IMF | 6.41 | | 3 | |
| # | Combined Value of Imports and Exports with Bordering Countries as Percentage of GDP according to International Trade Centre | | % | 0 | |
| # | Current Account Balance as Percentage of GDP according to World Bank | 9.6 | % | 0 | |
| # | Is the Country an Oil Exporter? | Yes | | 2 | |
| # | Manufacturing Exports as Percentage of Merchandise Exports according to World Bank | 0.183 | % | 2 | |
| | Subtotal | | | 11 | /26 |
| | Economic Subtotal | | | 76 | /105 |
| Environmental Factors | | | | | |
| # | Kilogram of Oil Consumption per Capita according to World Bank | 1457 | | 0 | |
| # | Percentage of Land Area in Agricultural Use according to World Bank | 21.2 | % | 4 | |
| # | Percentage of Land Area with > 50% Loss of Canopy according to Global Forest Watch | 0 | % | 0 | |
| | Subtotal | | | 4 | /16 |
| Societal Make-up and Population Statistics | | | | | |
| # | Is the Youth Population (Ages 15-24) over 20% of Total Population? (Youth Bulge) | Yes | | 8 | |
| # | Agricultural Workforce as Percentage of Total Employed Population according to World Bank | | % | 0 | |
| # | Urban Population as Percentage of Total according to World Bank | 69 | % | 0 | |
| # | Urbanization Growth Rate as Annual Percentage according to World Bank | 3.446 | % | 6 | |
| # | Is there Persecution of Indigenous Peoples as Reported by UNHCR or Minority Rights Group? | Yes | | 5 | |
| # | Population Density (people/sq. km of land area) according to World Bank | 78.01 | | 3 | |
| # | Is 20% of the Population or More Minority Ethnic Groups? | Yes | | 2 | |
| # | Is there a Religious Majority? | Yes | | 1 | |
| # | Population Growth Rate as Annual Percentage according to World Bank | 3.32 | % | 1 | |

| | | | |
|---|--------|------------|-------------|
| Subtotal | | 26 | /42 |
| Health Factors | | | |
| # Health Expenditure per Capita according to World Bank (current USD) | 339.4 | 9 | |
| # Food Security Score according to Global Food Security Index | | 0 | |
| # Percentage of Population with Access to Water according to World Bank | 87 % | 9 | |
| # Percentage of Population with Access to Sanitation according to World Bank | 85.6 % | 8 | |
| # Life Expectancy according to World Bank | 69.2 | 8 | |
| # Infant Mortality per 1,000 Child Births according to World Bank | 28.2 | 7 | |
| # Maternal Mortality per 100,000 Child Births according to World Bank | 50 | 0 | |
| # Kilocalories per Capita per Day according to Our World in Data | 2545 | 4 | |
| Subtotal | | 45 | /58 |
| Respect for Rights and Freedoms of Women and Children | | | |
| # Literacy Rate (Percentage of Total Population above 15) according to World Bank | 43.7 % | 11 | |
| # Is Abortion Prohibited Altogether or Permitted Only to Save Woman's Life? | Yes | 7 | |
| # Ratio of Girls to Boys Enrolled at Primary and Secondary Levels at Public and Private Schools according to World Bank | | 0 | |
| Subtotal | | 18 | /24 |
| Area Subtotal | | 209 | /303 |

| | | | |
|---|-----------|-----------|------------|
| Risk Area 3: Triggering Factors | | | |
| Declaration of state of emergency or special security measures that restrict the citizens' rights and pushback by citizens against government policy | | | |
| # Is there a declared state of emergency? | Yes | 3 | |
| # Are there Reports of Current Anti-Government Demonstrations? | Yes | 3 | |
| Subtotal | | 6 | /6 |
| Spillover effects of instability, tensions from conflicts in neighboring countries | | | |
| # Refugees Produced as Percent of Population according to UNHCR | 1.4893 % | 8 | |
| # Refugees Hosted as Percent of Population according to UNHCR | 0.74465 % | 5 | |
| Subtotal | | 13 | /13 |
| Area Subtotal | | 19 | /19 |

| | | | |
|--|-----|----|-----|
| Risk Area 4: Record of Past GVHRs | | | |
| Past or present commission of GVHRs, which include extrajudicial killings, torture, enforced disappearances, and rape | | | |
| # Are there Reports of Extrajudicial Killings? | Yes | 9 | |
| # Are there Reports of Torture? | Yes | 7 | |
| # Are there Reports of Enforced Disappearances? | Yes | 6 | |
| # Are there Reports of Rape? | Yes | 3 | |
| Subtotal | | 25 | /25 |

| | | |
|---|---|---------------|
| Lack of mass pushback in the face of ongoing GVHRs, absence of transitional justice or lack of initiatives for inclusivity and reconciliation following a conflict | | |
| # | Score for World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index's sub-factor: People Do Not Resort to Violence to Redress Personal Grievances | 0 |
| | Subtotal | 0 /6 |
| Impunity for evident GVHRs | | |
| # | Percentile Rank of Worldwide Governance Indicator: Rule of Law | 4 11 |
| | Subtotal | 11 /11 |
| | Area Subtotal | 36 /42 |


| | | |
|---|--|---------------|
| Risk Area 5: Weakness of State Institutions | | |
| Absence of legal framework that prevents GVHRs through the ratification of international human rights treaties | | |
| # | Did the Country Sign AND NOT Ratify ICPPED? | No 0 |
| # | Did the Country Sign AND NOT Ratify Convention Against Torture? | No 0 |
| | Subtotal | 0 /5 |
| Corruption and governance | | |
| # | Percentile Rank of Worldwide Governance Indicator: Regulatory Quality | 9 11 |
| # | Percentile Rank of Worldwide Governance Indicator: Control of Corruption | 8 11 |
| # | Percentile Rank of Worldwide Governance Indicator: Government Effectiveness | 14 10 |
| # | Percentile Rank of Worldwide Governance Indicator: Voice and Accountability | 16 6 |
| # | Number of Years since Most Recent Major Regime Change according to Center for Systemic Peace | 3 6 |
| # | Are there Ungoverned Spaces within the Country? | 0 |
| # | Level of Democracy Score according to Center for Systemic Peace | 4 3 |
| # | Government Expenditure as Percentage of GDP according to World Bank | 21 % 0 |
| # | Is the Country not an Electoral Democracy now, but was at one Time Prior? | No 0 |
| | Subtotal | 47 /55 |
| | Area Subtotal | 47 /60 |

Country Risk Score Profile

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
High

Appendix V: GVHR Country Selection from PITF Data



The map displays all 32 countries that were produced from the second iteration of sorting the PITF dataset. The team selected the four worst performing countries in each DoS region, which are represented in the map by a darker shade. The map shows that the additional 12 countries that were not selected were all in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Near East. As there were only 3 countries within the South and Central Asian region, an additional country was selected from Sub-Saharan Africa.


Appendix VI: Final GVHR and Clean Country Selection



The map displays all 30 countries selected as the sample size for the team’s research. GVHR countries are shaded by region, and the clean countries are pink. The countries are listed below.

| Sub-Saharan Africa | | Near East |
|------------------------------|--|-------------------------------|
| Sudan | | Iraq |
| Nigeria | | Syria |
| Burundi | | Yemen |
| Cote d’Ivoire | | Egypt |
| DR Congo | | Qatar (Clean) |
| Tanzania | | |
| Namibia | | Western Hemisphere |
| Botswana (Clean) | | Brazil |
| | | Honduras |
| East Asia and Pacific | | Bolivia |
| Philippines | | Guatemala |
| Thailand | | Ecuador |
| Myanmar | | Uruguay (Clean) |
| Laos | | |
| Vietnam | | South and Central Asia |
| Singapore (Clean) | | Bangladesh |
| Japan (Clean) | | India |
| Taiwan (Clean) | | Sri Lanka |

Appendix VII: Country Risk Scores



The map displays the risk score that each of the 30 sample countries received through a gradient. The countries receiving the highest level of risk for committing GVHRs are black, while the countries at the lowest risk level are pink. The table gives the numerical CRS for each country.

| Country | CRS | Country | CRS |
|---------------|-----|-----------|-----|
| Nigeria | 425 | Ecuador | 357 |
| DRC | 410 | Syria | 352 |
| Guatemala | 402 | Laos | 344 |
| Philippines | 392 | Vietnam | 341 |
| Sudan | 392 | Bolivia | 340 |
| Egypt | 389 | Iraq | 334 |
| Tanzania | 388 | Thailand | 306 |
| Sri Lanka | 385 | Brazil | 291 |
| India | 380 | Namibia | 275 |
| Cote d'Ivoire | 379 | Botswana | 110 |
| Myanmar | 378 | Qatar | 52 |
| Burundi | 374 | Singapore | 40 |
| Yemen | 373 | Uruguay | 30 |
| Bangladesh | 372 | Japan | 11 |
| Honduras | 367 | Taiwan | 9 |

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